



Depart

Forumgebou  
Forum Building

Pretoria Republiek van Suid-Afrika  
001 Pretoria Republic of South Africa

366

J10/2/5135

R W van ZYL

290-2485

222-005918

GESERTIFISEERDE

POS

CERTIFIED MAIL

The Chief Executive Director  
South African Airways  
P O Box 7778  
JOHANNESBURG  
2000

1988-07-14

CERTIFIED MAIL

Attention : Mr G D van der Veer

ACCIDENT TO BOEING 747-244B AEROPLANE ZS-SAS NEAR  
MAURITIUS ON 1987-11-28

1. During a interview with you on 1988-03-30 it was agreed that you would provide this office with written answers to certain questions regarding the cargo carried in the aeroplane during its last flight. As no response to the questions has as yet been received, the investigator-in-charge of the investigation of the accident mr RW van Zyl now formally requests, in terms of regulation 7(b) read with regulation 14 of the Regulations Regarding the Investigation of Aircraft Accidents 1973, that you provide him before 1988-07-28 with the following information regarding cargo carried on SAA aircraft.

1.1 Do you have any knowledge of any ammunitions, weapons of war or any hazardous cargo or goods that may have been on board aeroplane ZS-SAS during its last flight?

1.2 Are there any in-house instructions or directives that require you or any other person in your management to be notified when any of the aforementioned hazardous goods are to be or were carried in a South African Airways aircraft?

Did South African Airways at any time ensure that




its cargo handling agents at Chaing Kai-Shek Airport, Taipei, will handle cargo for South African Airways in accordance with internationally accepted procedures?

1.4 If the answer to question 1.3 above is in the affirmative -

(i) when was it determined that cargo will be handled in accordance with specified procedures?

(ii) by whom were such procedures issued or published?

2. Your assistance and co-operation in an early reply would be highly appreciated.



for DIRECTOR-GENERAL : TRANSPORT



South African Airways  
P O Box 7778 Johannesburg 2000  
Republic of South Africa

Suid-Afrikaanse Lugdiens  
Posbus 7778 Johannesburg 2000  
Republiek van Suid-Afrika

Room 1404  
Paul Kruger Building

28 July 1988

Director General : Transport  
Department of Transport  
Private Bag X193  
PRETORIA  
0001

RECEIVED : 100 R.W. van Byl

ACCIDENT TO BOEING 747-244B AEROPLANE ZS-SAS. NEAR. MAURITIUS.  
ON 1987-11-28

Your letter J10/2/5135 of 12 July 1988 has reference. 228

The answers to the questions posed in your letter under  
reply are as follows :

1.1 No knowledge.

1.2 Yes, the standard IATA based General Conditions of  
Carriage of Cargo apply to the carriage of all cargo  
and in particular the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations.

1.3 Yes, in terms of the standard IATA based Ground  
Handling Agreement.

1.4 (i) When the said Ground Handling Agreement was  
entered into with China Airlines.

(ii) By SA Airways but based on standard IATA  
documentation.

I trust the above information will satisfy your needs.

With kind regards

A.L. MALHERBE  
CHIEF LEGAL ADVISER



I **MARTHINUS DE WET JACOBS** identity no 5506055051008 willingly make this statement under oath.

My business address is Room 1230, 12th Floor, Bank Tower Building 205, Tun Hua North Road Taipei 10592 Taiwan R.O.C. tel (02)713-6363.

I am employed by South African Airways, (SAA) as a Country Manager since 1985 and also held this post at London before I was appointed Country Manager at Taipei in April 1987.

My primary function as Country Manager is to represent SAA in all aspects of its operation at the place where I have been appointed.

As far as I can recall I did not speak to any of the crew members on flight SA 294 which was the flight number of ZS-SAS on 27 November 1987 from Mauritius to Taipei. I did however speak to Captain Uys who was the pilot-in-command of flight SA 295 which departed from Chiang Kai Shek Airport on 27 November 1987. When I spoke to Captain Uys he was his normal self and did not complain about anything nor did he appear distressed.

I have not supervised or inspected the loading of flight SA 295 but I am certain that only six loaded pallets were placed in the main deck cargo compartment as we did not have enough cargo for a seventh pallet. I know from past experience that pallet loads from Tokyo are always covered with plastic sheeting. Two loaded pallets were received from Tokyo on Cathay Pacific flight CX 005 which arrived at 10h00 Taiwan time on 27 November 1987. These loaded pallets were first stored in the Airport warehouse and afterwards put on board the aeroplane (ZS-SAS) at positions PL (left front) and SL (left rear). These two pallets from Tokyo were the only ones covered with plastic sheets.

I am responsible for the handling of cargo destined for SAA flights but this function has been contracted out to China Air Lines. I would have been informed if dangerous goods were to have been included in the cargo but no such information was given to me. During the time I was stationed at Taipei I have never



been asked to handle military cargo nor has there been any irregularity in respect of cargo.

After arrival of a SAA flight at Chiang Kai Shek Airport the following procedures are followed :

After disembarkation of passengers and crew the airbridge door at the terminal end is locked. The cleaners of Taoyuan International Airport Services Co, the technical staff of China Air Lines and the catering personnel of Grand Hotel In Flight Food Centre then board the air bridge by means of an outside staircase to enter the aircraft. After the aircraft has been cleaned the technical staff of China Air Lines lock the aircraft doors and remove the airbridge. From the time of arrival of the aircraft until it is pushed back for departure it is guarded by an aviation policeman.

Before departure of a SAA aircraft the following procedures are followed:

The aircraft is dressed and catering supplies are loaded. One hour before departure the cabin crew boards the aircraft.

Approximately one hour fifteen minutes before departure the pilot-in-command visits the operations room for weather briefing and decides on fuel requirements, after having received loading details. Final fuel requirements are then passed to refuellers. Prior to push back the pilot-in-command is provided with the loadsheets for approval. If any dangerous goods are to be carried on the aircraft the pilot-in-command will be informed accordingly.

On 27 November 1987 flight SA 295 was delayed from 21h00 to 22h10 due to the late arrival of connecting flights. The connecting flights were delayed because of unfavourable weather.

In my opinion the security arrangements at Chiang Kai Shek Airport are above average especially in respect of cargo handling. It is for instance a requirement that all cargo originating in Taiwan must be kept in the Airport warehouse for at least twenty four hours before it is loaded on an aircraft.



All persons employed on the Airport are security screened and cleared.

I have no other information which can be used to find the cause of the accident in which ZS-SAS had been involved. As far as I know there was nothing unusual or abnormal about the cargo or that dangerous goods were on board ZS-SAS. The last departure of ZS-SAS was normal in all respects.

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and is made with the knowledge that, if it is tendered in evidence I shall be liable to prosecution if I deliberately stated anything which I know to be false or which I do not believe to be true.

Signed by met at Jan Smuts on 25 April 1989.

**M D JACOBS**



I LOURENS JOHANNES STEPHANUS BOOYSE state that I am willing to make the following statement under oath :

I am the Director of Civil Aviation Administration of the Department of Transport. I am Inter alia also on behalf of the Commissioner for Civil Aviation responsible for security measures at State Airports in the Republic of South Africa.

During the period 10 - 22 December 1987 I investigated security measures regarding the handling of cargo and passengers at Taipei's Chiang Kai Shek Airport. I was assisted by a senior member of the South African Police who was at the time in charge of S A Police operations at all State Airports and the Director of South African Airways Security.

After our investigation I was completely satisfied that cargo and passenger handling security measures at Chiang Kai Shek Airport were at least equal to those of any Airport in the Western world.

As publication of the security measures investigated by me can jeopardise security at airports I regard the details of our investigation as secret.

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it, knowing that, if it were tendered in evidence I would be liable to prosecution if I wilfully stated in it anything which I knew to be false or which I did not believe to be true.

*Booyse*  
*9 May 1989*



Taipei Custom House  
Ministry of Finance

373

August 17, 1988

Ref. (77) Pei Pu Chu  
NO. 4830

To: Taipei Office, South Africa Airline

cc: Inspectorate General of Customs

Purport: Reply to your inquiry concerning the random sampling of the items for export shipped per SA-295 on November 27, 1987. The B/L NOs. randomly selected for sampling and the outcome of sampling are enclosed for your reference.

Explanations:


1. Action is taken according to the short form letter of Inspectorate General of Customs NO. (77) Tai Tson Chu Cheng NO. 2959 dated August 10, 1988 and your letter Ref. TPE/95/317/88 dated August 4, 1988.

2. The related information is as follows:

<u>B/L selected for sampling</u>	<u>Outcome of sampling</u>
297-40111830 LEC-O 5785(E)	Agreement with what was declared
297-40119306 ATC-S12643	" " "
297-40119306 ATF-870833	" " "
297-40119306 PAC-870990	" " "
297-40103991 NSAS-880471	" " "
297-40103991 NEAS-880482	" " "
297-40055993 TAC-877105	" " "
297-40114852 ICF-667452	" " "
297-40147026 TRE-87111050	" " "
297-40147026 AEL-810107	" " "
297-40119343	" " "

3. The results of inspection have been sent to you in a letter NO. (77) Pei Pu Chu 2220 dated April 19, 1988. A copy of the letter is enclosed for your reference.

統一編號



傳真  
電話  
地址

地址  
電話  
傳真



Taipei Custom House  
Ministry of Finance

371 (B)

April 19, 1988

Ref. (77) Pei Pu Chu  
NO. 2220

To: Taipei Office, South Africa Airline

Purport: Reference is made to your letter Ref. TPE/0/5/142/88

dated March 24, 1988.

In connection with the random sampling of the items for export shipped per your flight NO. 295 on November 27, 1987 from CKS airport to the destination, it was noted that there were 111 declaration forms concerning the items carried by the aforesaid plan. It was further noted that the declaration forms were handed in on November 24 and November 27 respectively (The items for export must be sent to the godown before declaration is made. The items, their weights, and numbers were all covered in the declaration form). All the information of the items shipped by your company together with those shipped by other companies were fed into computer and the numbers of the B/Ls had been randomly selected by that computer. Of all the B/Ls issued by your company, 11 were randomly selected for sampling and it was found that the B/Ls were in fully agreement with what was declared. No inspection or sampling was made to the items whose B/Ls were not selected.

Explanation:

It is hoped that the aforesaid gives you the information

you need.

統一翻譯社



ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

001208000000000000

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Tel 7710000 - 7080000 - 7081000 - 7110000

7110000 - 7110000 - 7110000 - 7110000

信義社

信義社三段126號2樓

Tel 7040000-7080000

0000000

城中社

廣興路33號2樓

Tel 3010000-3010000

3110000-3110000

0000000



RESTRICTED

81/172589  
(Z 14)



G.P.-S. (F-B)

REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Verw. Nr./Ref. No. PTBG/406/12/4/1  
NAVRAE/ENQUIRIES: Brig P.J.C. Gagiano  
Tel. No. 291-2001

KANTOOR VAN DIE—OFFICE OF THE

Mr R.W. van Zyl  
Department of Civil Aviation  
Private Bag X193  
Pretoria  
0001

Chief of the SA Defence Force  
Private Bag X141  
Pretoria  
0001

17 May, 1989

Rec 890579

Dear Sir

**BOARD OF ENQUIRY : BOEING 747 HELDERBERG**

1. The Signal PTBG/406/12/4/1 dated 28 April 1989 refers.
2. It is hereby confirmed that no weapons or explosive devices of the SA Defence Force were on board of the Boeing 747, Helderberg, on 27 November 1987.

(J.J. GELDENHUYS)  
CHIEF OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE : GENERAL



To: Taipei Office, South Africa Airline - 2

376

Hou Teh-Kee  
Commissioner

(Sealed)





**KRYGKOR  
ARMSCOR**

Private Sak X337  
0001 Pretoria  
Republiek van Suid-Afrika  
Telegramme ARMSCOR

Private Bag X337  
0001 Pretoria  
Republic of South Africa  
Telegrams ARMSCOR

320217  
☎ (012) 292-9111

The Director General : Transport  
Forum Building  
Struben Street  
Private Bag X193  
PRETORIA  
0001

Datum/Date 16 June 1989

Navraag/Enquiries

☎ (012) 292 - 2611

Ons verw/Our ref

U verw/Your ref J10/2/5135 Nr R W van Zyl


Sir

**AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT : SAA BOEING 747 COMBI AIRCRAFT ZS-SAS**

I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 29 May 1989, the contents of which have been noted.

The relevant records of Armscor have been thoroughly investigated and it is hereby confirmed that no consignment of cargo to or from Armscor was on board flight SA 295 on or about the 29th November 1987.

Yours faithfully

  
J G J VAN VUUREN  
EXECUTIVE GENERAL MANAGER





COPY GIVEN  
TO JANJAN

# The Star BUSINESS REPORT

PUBLISHED IN JOHANNESBURG, CAPE TOWN, DURBAN AND PRETORIA BY INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS • 582 000 READERS • FRIDAY, AUGUST 7 1998

SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL FINANCIAL DAILY

*Declaration stated no explosives were sent on civilian flight to Argentina, despite confused paperwork*

## Weapons flown in SAA cargo

JONATHAN ROSENTHAL AND  
RICHARD STOVIN-BRADFORD

Johannesburg — Denel, the state-owned arms producer, may have flouted international air safety regulations by loading 25 000 military grenades bound for Peru on a passenger flight from Johannesburg to Buenos Aires on June 28, according to reports by Latin American media.

Denel said this week it had loaded 365 grenade launchers on flight SA 207 but denied that the launchers were accompanied by grenades, which it said were sent by ship.

Therishi Tulwana, Denel's corporate affairs manager, said the grenades were sent directly to Peru by ship from Durban on June 22 and not by plane with the launchers.

Witnesses to the arrival of the arms consignment at Lima, Peru, on July 16, however, said the boxes contained both 40mm grenades and launchers.

The consignment, which was flown in from Buenos Aires on a Peruvian airforce plane after being detained for several days by Argentine authorities, was offloaded in the presence of the media at the Eighth Air Group base in Lima.

Cesar Saucedo Sanchez, the

Peruvian defence minister, reportedly told journalists that the consignment consisted of 365 grenade launchers and 25 000 grenades. His comments were reported on local television and in Jane's Defence Weekly, the influential defence publication.

Juan Carlos Lujan, an editor at the Lima-based newspaper El Comercio de Lima, said: "They (the army) showed grenade launchers and 25 000 grenades to the press (at the airbase)." He said the minister invited members of the press to open boxes at random.

Aviation safety regulations laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, a UN body, state that when explosives are carried by passenger aircraft the shipper must inform the airline and abide by stringent packing and loading regulations.

Aviation safety experts said this week that any such shipment should be clearly marked with precise details of the hazardous material.

The Argentine newspapers,



**EXPLOSIVE PAYLOAD** This picture, published in a Peruvian newspaper, shows the country's minister of defence, Cesar Saucedo, examining the weapons consignment from Denel.

Clarín and La Nación, said the arms consignment was detained in Buenos Aires by Argentine authorities over an alleged discrepancy between the accompanying documents and the content of the boxes.

The papers said Argentine au-

thorities said the documents stated the boxes contained "cleaning grenades for 40mm guns". Peruvian and Denel spokesmen attributed this to a translation error, and Denel said that "cleaning grenades" did not exist.

SAA spokesman Leon Els said

the airline had been given a signed declaration stating there were no hazardous goods, such as explosives, in the Denel consignment. The waybill documentation accompanying the cargo said it contained weaponry, he said. He declined to provide the waybill.

A Peruvian embassy spokesman in Pretoria confirmed Denel's statement of the two modes of transport. But while Denel said there were two bills of lading, one for each consignment, the embassy spokesman was firm that there was only a single bill covering both.

He was unable to explain why the grenades and grenade launchers were apparently unloaded simultaneously from the Buenos Aires flight to Lima.

This controversial Denel arms consignment reignited diplomatic tension between Argentina, Peru and Ecuador last month when Argentine airforce police discovered boxes containing weapons in the customs depository of Ezeiza airport in Buenos Aires.

The Argentine authorities immediately impounded the weapons and called in the federal judicial authorities as Argentina is prohibited from exporting arms to either Peru or Ecuador.

Business Watch, Page 2



NOV. 28 2006 09:44AM F1

PHONE NO. : 0027116743578

FROM : WATKINS RESIDENCE  
\* JOHN, PLS DON'T BE FRIGHTENED

OF TALKING ABOUT THE "H"!

URGENT FAX COMMUNICATION.

PLS GIVE  
THIS TO TIM  
IF YOU  
DON'T  
WANT TO  
USE IT  
Thanks  
Brian

REPEAT

021 685 7748

From: BRIAN WATKINS  
FLORIDA PARK  
JOHANNESBURG

TEL/FAX: 674-3578  
CELL : 083-324-1530

TUESDAY 28 NOV 2006

→ JOHN ROBBIE  
RADIO 702  
JOHANNESBURG

FAX 506-3475


Hello John,

HELDERBERG ! 27/28 NOV 1987

I heard you refer to the Helderberg disaster shortly before the 6:30am news - possibly prompted by a newspaper report?

Here for your info is what REALLY happened - what PREVIOUS/PRESENT Governments / the Margo Commission / the TRC / the CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) and various other State Departments / 'spokesmen' prevented being exposed at ALL costs during the past 19 YEARS !!  
FIRSTLY... WHOM AM I ??

1. I was employed by SAA for nearly 40 years (have been in retirement for 13 years).
2. Before and after the H incident I held a unique position in the Management Structure of SAA.
3. My family and I were threatened with DEATH on 03 JAN 1988 (when it was found that I had discovered ..... what had actually happened to the H) IF I divulged what I knew, to you (the MEDIA), family, - even colleagues who were not 'privy' to the facts!





Page 2.

HERE ARE A FEW **FACTS** - NOT CONSPIRACY THEORIES !!!

1. On 19 Nov - 9 days before the disaster - I warned SAA re the terrible dangers of transporting military materials on our A/c - at a POST-CRASH SEMINAR held at the conclusion of a bi-annual INTR Marketing and Sales Conf. at the Wild Coast Inn - conducted by the eminent pathologist SIR RICHARD KENYON (contractor to many of the World's major airlines, incl. SAA) and his specialised, expert team. That was the same day as the KINGS CROSS underground Station FIRE that killed 30 persons. (Richard's team were also there --)
2. The A/c was transporting a consignment of Ammonium PERCHLORATE ("AP") urgently required by Armscor for the production of special fuel for the missiles to be fired by SAAF Mirages in Angola. Gen. Chabes' forces (MIG-23's) had shot down 2 mirages (denied!) as his forces were approaching the S.E. corner of S.W.A. The factory at Somerset West (Cape) had closed temporarily for building extension.
3. ALSO ON BOARD was a 'normal' consignment of FIREWORKS, ordered by the Mossel Bay Municipality for their 500 year BARTHOLOMEW DIAZ celebration. They probably ignited as a result of shifting, due to extreme turbulence over the South China Sea area, a short while after departing CKS Apt (Taipei). That caused the FIRST FIRE but it was "subduable/controllable" with reasonable success. The SECOND FIRE ("AP") occurred considerably later in the flight --



Page 3

4. Capt. Dawie Nyo was continuously DENIED permission to divert to ALL of, at least, EIGHT major airports to execute a (possible) crash landing - INCLUDING the major U.S. NAVAL/AIR BASE at DIEGO GARCIA, where an SAA Boeing to Hong Kong had landed a few years previously (Capt. Fenton) due to a fire warning, which turned out to be due to a mere MOTH (!) getting into a wiring loom and causing a short circuit. One of the air hostesses met a US Naval Officer, married him and settled in the USA BUT SAA MAINTAINED THEY HAD NEVER LANDED AT DG!! (The landing had been quickly authorised by the American Ambassador (in Portoria))
5. The 'authorities', <sup>were</sup> aware of the extreme danger of transporting AP, had plans in place, should the A/c catch fire, as there was no way that they could 'permit' the A/c crash-landing on foreign soil, which would have exposed their sanctions-busting activities to the world, with serious consequences!!
- Perhaps the A/c might then crash into the sea BUT if it didn't, they had to refuse diversions and bring it within range of the S.A. Military... so when the fires started, they were ready.
- A Boeing 707 tanker A/c (60 Squadron) took off and refuelled the ('short-range') Mirage on the outboard sector, so that it could reach and DESTROY the A/c (murdering 159 souls!!) FACE THE FACTS - THIS IS NOT A CONSPIRACY THEORY! Regards Brian Wal



Marais Wessels  
Professional video cameraman & Producer


Box 434 Aucklandpark 2006  
Mobile. +27 (0) 82-601-1026  
e-mail: [vbl@telkomsa.net](mailto:vbl@telkomsa.net)

18/04/2006

Statement regarding the Helderberg Aircraft Disaster.

1. I have been employed by Transnet from 1985-1991 in the position as a Video Cameraman. During that period I was involved in the production of various training video modules for SAA, Railways and Harbours. Shortly after the Helderberg Aircraft incident (June-July 1988) we were busy on a production on Aircraft accidents (Operation Overshoot) I met up with Tinus Jacobs who was the Manager in Taipei for that time. We were gathering footage in Taipei and he mentioned to me that he have some "paperwork" locked away. My idea was that it could help him if there were any court cases/queries against him personally or in his position as manager in Taipei.
2. During another visit to Singapore in 1992 senior SAA officials ask the Cargo Manager for SAA in Singapore (Mike van Niekerk) about the volumes of cargo. He replied that they still flying the weekly Armscor container with "hairdryers". He did not explain what the "hairdryers" were.

Both statements are accurate as I remember keeping in mind that both incidents happened more than 15 years ago.

  
P.J.M. Wessels

Date: 21/04/2006

Place: FAIRLAND

FAIRLAND 2006-04-21 14 14

  
5053096

Grey Motybeni

Sophia Street and 11th Ave.





I Lucas Johannes Meyer a male ID6109225087082, residing at 25 Sintra court, Horizon view, Cell 082 854 0195.

Declare under oath that a few days after the Helderberg crashed a few of my fellow workers and I stood in the smoke room of the Avionics building on the 1<sup>st</sup> floor. The point of discussion was the Helderberg. Colin Dick, who worked with us, introduced us to his son who just joined us. During the discussion Gavin Dick mentioned that they (ZUR the company frequency) were the last people to talk to the Helderberg. At that stage we only new that the Helderberg reported a smoke problem and then went down. Everybody was very eager to find out what happened and we then asked Gavin to tell us what happened. He told us that the Helderberg reported a fire to them not long after they left Taiwan. They requested permission from ZUR to turn back to Taiwan. I found this strange because it is the Captains decision to turn back or not. Gavin then said that they were instructed to tell the Helderberg to continue on course till they get permission from higher authority to turn back. He never said who the higher authority was.

Gavin said that a while later the Helderberg were told that permission has been denied to turn back and that they should continue to Mauritius. He did not give any more details about why the decision was made.

A few days later Gavin Dick again visited his father and again the discussion was around the Helderberg. I and some of the other people asked him about the previous comment about them talking to the Helderberg. He then denied that they talked to the Helderberg and said the Helderberg missed its compulsory contact and that they never spoke to them. He denied that he said that they were the last people to speak to the Helderberg.



MARK BERNARD WHALE  
states under oath:

(1)  
I am an adult male, residing at 12  
Sypie Road, Rooihuiskraal, Portoria. My  
contact no is 083 212 5138

(2)  
I was appointed the chief investigator  
into the causes of the crash of the  
Helderberg aircraft during November 1987

(3)  
During the course of my investigations I  
approached Samantha Van der Walt  
(nee Sattering). She represented the committee  
of relatives of those who died during  
the crash. She lost both parents in the crash.

(4)  
The two of us established a good working  
relationship. Mrs Van der Walt complied  
with any requests directed  
to her. She also supplied me with  
various files, information, statements  
etc. that had been compiled by the  
committee.

(5)  
Reference to the above paragraph is  
made in the October 2001 report to the  
Hon. Minister of Transport, Minister Oorwa

(6)

R. B. Whale  
M.B. WHALE



Confidential

Dr Klatzow



Office of the Head  
Operational Support Division  
PRETORIA

Enq: SST Van Caster  
Tel: 012 450 7543  
Ref: S/10 (DSD OPS)

20 September 2001

The Honourable Mr AM Omer  
Minister of Transport  
National Department of Transport  
PRETORIA  
0001

Dear Minister Omer

FEEDBACK REPORT: HELDERBERG PLANE DISASTER

1. Provides preliminary report dated 2001-10-08 with similar heading notes.
2. During this continuous investigation the following individuals were contacted and/or interviewed in an attempt to receive more confirmed information or relevant evidence regarding this investigative enquiry namely:

2.1. Mr. Johan de Waal:

He is the SAA Director of Protection Services at the Johannesburg International Airport. Mr De Waal was interviewed in an attempt to trace Mr Tony Seeliger in Singapore. To date Mr De Waal could however not report any detailed information on Mr Seeliger.

2.2. Mr. Chang:

Mr Chang is the station manager at Singapore Airlines. He was also interviewed and requested (verbally and in writing) to provide the investigation team with the whereabouts of Mr Seeliger. No cooperation was received in this attempt to trace Mr Seeliger.

Confidential

from Ernest Mabuza

80-5629



Confidential

### 2.3. Advocate Willem Bester.

Adv Bester is the legal representative of Ms. Jara Uys, widow of the late Captain Dawie Uys. He was approached in order to assist Ms. Jara Uys during a planned interview. However Adv Bester informed Adv Welch that his client Ms Uys, does not want to be interviewed or assist this investigation in any way. Apparently her reasons were personal and she felt that the matter had been dealt with and must be laid to rest.

### 2.3. Mr Mickey Mitchell

He was the SAA Chief Director Operations during the Helderberg disaster. According to Mr Mitchell he was at home when the operations tower phoned him and informed him of the disaster. He then went to the operational tower, ZUR. He consequently phoned Mr Vir Lewis second in charge, who then contacted the CEO, Mr Gert van der Veer. Mr van der Veer also then went to the ZUR. Mr Mitchell indicated that he did not attempt to make radio contact with the Helderberg due to the fact that according to the radio communications logbook, it was not necessary. He also indicated that top officials were in the ZUR. However he cannot remember who had been present at that time. All procedures were followed at that time according to IATA.

Mr Mitchell could not comment on the exact detail when the Helderberg crashed or "went down". Furthermore he could not comment on the theories regarding the two oil spill debris fields and the two fire scenario on board of the plane. He also indicated that he does not know what happened to the ZUR tapes that recorded the plane disaster. Mr Mitchell stated that at no given time would a SAA captain endanger the lives of his passengers, even if an instruction was given from a government minister to fly dangerous goods.

He further indicated that Captain Dawie Uys was an experienced pilot whom knew the safety procedures very well.

Mr Mitchell also indicated that the words "Boy George" have no meaning to him in the flying environment.

### 2.4 Mr Gert van der Veer.

Mr van der Veer was the SAA CEO during the Helderberg plane disaster. He indicated that during the apartheid years it was necessary for him to make use of "survival techniques" to keep SAA operational at that stage. This was due to sanctions. He indicated that he offered countries especially in the East, on the Taiwan route, money for landing rights. He furthermore arranged technical assistance to Far East countries in order to allow SAA to land in the respective countries.



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Mr van der Veer also indicated that no dangerous goods had been transported on any SAA plane. The IATA regulations were adhered to due to the fact that he had a "business" to manage and could not afford any other problems within SAA at that stage.

He stated that it was a fire, which caused the aeroplane to crash and that fires on board of aeroplanes are not an abnormal phenomenon. He also stated that the aeroplane could have broken in half in the air due to the fire and/or severe weight. According to Mr van der Veer an aeroplane from Lusitania Airlines also broke in half in the Kenya airport.

Mr van der Veer acknowledged the fact that he had a working relationship with the National Intelligence Service and the South African Police at that stage due to security and safety reasons.

He also indicated that Captain Davie Uys was an excellent pilot who done everything according to the book.

## 2.5 Dr David Klaczow:

Dr Klaczow is an independent forensic consultant who did extensive research on the Helderberg air disaster. During this interview Dr Klaczow mostly disputed and argued the issuing of section 705 summonses according to the Criminal Procedure Act.

He further explained all his theories and findings, although it was not based on relevant criminal facts or evidence.

Dr Klaczow indicated that he would assist in our investigation if he could receive the "Witch reports" to minister Omar with regards to the investigation. It was agreed that he could receive the reports for his information only.

## 2.6 Ms Samantha van der Walt:

Ms van der Walt lost both her parents in the air disaster. She is a representative for the friends of the victims of the Helderberg (FOVOH). She accompanied Dr Klaczow to the indicated interview. Although she did not report any new information she also agreed to assist with the investigation.

## 3. With regards to the interviews that took place, the following investigative elucidation could be made, namely:

3.1 No confirmed information regarding Mr Tony Smelgar was received. Officials from the CAA made contact with him but no relevant questions were put to Mr Smelgar with regards to the Helderberg disaster.

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More attempts were made to trace Mr Snelgar who is an important potential witness in this investigative enquiry. However it will be a great financial expenditure for government to travel to Singapore in an attempt to trace Mr Snelgar.

- 3.2 Adv Sias Reyncke who apparently works for TRANSNET assisted both Mr Mitchell and Mr van der Veer. Adv Reyncke indicated that he is the legal representative for the two said individuals and that TRANSNET has a monitoring role to play in this investigation.


It was said during both mentioned interviews that Mr van der Veer and Mr Mitchell do not want to make any new statements and that they will abide with their statements made to the TRC.

It should be mentioned that Mr van der Veer as the CEO for the SAA during the stage of this air disaster did not testify before the Margo Commission.

- 3.3 Dr. Klatzow was again approach for assistance after the mentioned interview. He then raised the matter that he will assist if government can give him a financial budget to do further investigations into the Helderberg disaster. No promises were made to Dr Klatzow as well as no assistance was received from him up until now.

- 3.4 All relevant statements were copied and send to the CEO of the CAA for their assessment.

4. The investigation team is in a process of contacting Mr Judge Bredder, Mr Peter de Beer and Mr JJ van Rooyen. Continuous arrangements to gather more information and evidence are still taking place.
5. A further report will be forwarded in due course.



Adv JJ Welch  
Deputy Director: Public Prosecutions  
Head: Operational Support



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**TO:** THE HON. A.M OMAR  
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT

**FROM:** ADV J WELCH  
MR M WHALE

**DATE:** UPDATED 8 OCTOBER 2001

SCORPIONS

PO Box 752, Pretoria 0001

Floor, Maize Board Building

Belvedere St, Arcadia

Pretoria, South Africa

Tel: (012) 321 9988

Fax: (012) 328 9940

**PRELIMINARY REPORT: HELDERBERG PLANE DISASTER:**

**1. BACKGROUND:**

**1.1** On the 28 th November 1987 at approximately 00:07:00 a South African Airways Boeing 747-244B Combi crashed into the Indian ocean 134 nautical miles north- east of the Plaisance Airport of Mauritius. There were 140 passengers and 19 crew aboard. Nobody survived.

**1.2** Judge Margo was appointed to head a Board of Inquiry into the crash. The finding of the board was that " The accident allowed an uncontrolled fire in the forward right pallet on the main deck cargo compartment. The aircraft crashed into the sea at high speed following a loss of control consequent on the fire.

**1.3** The substance involved in the combustion included plastic and cardboard packing material, but the actual source of ignition cannot be determined. There was no connection between the



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accident and the omission of Station ZUR to communicate with the Helderberg at the pre-arranged time. Nor is there any significance in the fact that the ZUR tape covering the time was mislaid or wiped out by later use. The board was unable to find or conclude that fireworks or any other illegal cargo were carried in the aircraft."

1.4 During the investigations into the activities of Dr Wouter Basson, certain information was received about the crash. This was followed up without any success. It should be mentioned that during Dr Basson's trial, his defence council referred to the fire on board the Helderberg as a classic "chemical fire".

1.5 This is in contradiction with the finding of the board, which stated that the combustion included plastic and cardboard packing material. No mention was made of chemical material.

## 2. INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT IN AMERICA AND CANADA:

2.1 Adv Welch and Mr Whale departed from South Africa for America and Canada on 2000/9/22 and returned on 2000/10/13. The trip was approved by the National Director of Public Prosecutors and the Minister of Transport. The acting CEO of the Civil Aviation Authority



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( CAA ) gave a written undertaking to cover all the costs incurred during the trip.

- 2.2 The main purpose of the trip was to make a CD copy of the original Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR ) of the Helderberg and an enhanced CD copy of the original CVR and also to consult with various potential witnesses' within America and Canada. The costs incurred during the trip were well inside the approved budget for the trip.
- 2.3 Both members were well received by members of the Engineering Research Facility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) at Quantico, Virginia. Mr David J Synder ( the 3<sup>rd</sup> ) was assigned to assist us in making the copy of the CVR and also in making an enhanced copy. We spent four days at the Facility assisting Mr Snyder in various ways and also in making the various CD disks. Thereafter four copies of all the CD disks were made and handed over to us. No costs were incurred during the making of these CD disks. In total 20 CD disks were made.
- The necessary requirements in terms of our Criminal Procedure Act were maintained in terms of the so-called chain evidence.
- 2.4 The opinion was that the original CVR tape was still in very good condition, considering where it had originally been found and also the time that had



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elapsed since the disaster. Mr Snyder was also reasonable pleased with the copies he had been able to make. The facility was not in a position to make a transcript of the CD tapes. This will have to be done at a later stage.

2.5 We then travelled to Tampa in Florida, where we consulted with Mr Cornelius (Neels) Christofel Van Wyk ( Van Wyk ). A complete sworn statement was obtained from him, as well as some documents and a summary of his investigations, consultations with various people as well as his own opinions on various issues.

2.6 It would appear as if his interest in this matter started shortly after Norman Chandler wrote certain articles in the Sunday Star. These articles eventually resulted in Armscor reporting the newspaper to the press council. Van Wyk's brother also went into business with Mr Theuns Jacobs, Mr K.C. Woo and another person. This business is known as Crown Travel. They originally invested R 40,000-00 each and after two years the company had a profit of R 82 million. His brother eventually left the business and now owes his own Crown Travel in Jeffery's Bay. The relevance if this is that Jacobs was the station master for SAA in Taipei and Woo was the load master. Both were responsible for the loading of the cargo aboard the Helderberg. Van Wyk also alleged that Crown travel received a 15% commission from SAA, whilst other

travel agents only receive 9%.



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2.7 Van Wyk made contact with Rennie Van Zyl ( Van Zyl ), who at the time was employed at the Directorate of Civil Aviation, and wanted to make a copy of the CVR. At that stage he was thinking of making a TV program about the Helderberg. It was at the time of the 10 th anniversary of the disaster. Van Zyl brought him the original CVR tape and Brendon Furrel at the SABC made a CD disk of the tape. The original tape was returned to Van Zyl immediately. It is this CD disk of the CVR that Van Wyk later on posted to Mr Jack Mitchell ( Mitchell ), in order for him to make a transcript.

2.8 After receiving financial backing ( \$ 10.000-00 ) from Mr Richard Price from England, Van Wyk went looking for somebody to make a transcript of the disk. Mitchell contacted Van Wyk and indicated that he was 90% sure that he ( Mitchell ) could make a transcript. A deal was struck and the CD disk of the CVR as well as Dr Jansen's original transcript were posted by Van Wyk to Mitchell. Mitchell then made his transcript of the disk that he had received from Van Wyk. It is this transcript that has recently been published in various newspapers in South Africa. The newspaper "Beeld" paid 10.000-00 pounds for the transcript.

2.9 There were numerous questions that came out of the consultations with Van Wyk. These would need to be looked at. He also supplied us with certain contact numbers of a Mr Bob Williams, whom Van Wyk informed us had vital



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information. Despite numerous attempts, contact could not be made with Mr Williams during our stay in Tampa. Numerous messages were left for him to contact us on our return to South Africa. Mr Williams also sent a letter to the TRC. He has not yet contacted us. Van Wyk also informed us that Lloyds of London is taking an interested view of recent developments. Lloyds paid out about R 650 million to SAA for the lost of the aircraft. It would appear as if Van Wyk has already made contact with Lloyds on this issue.

2.10 We are both a bit suspicious about Van Wyk's motives in this whole issue. It would appear as if he would like to make money out of the whole episode. It is a fact that he has already put many hours and work into this, but we feel that he might not be as objective as he should be.

2.11 Following the visit to Van Wyk, we met Mitchell in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Mitchell confirmed his contacts with Van Wyk and the fact that he made the transcript of the disk. He confirmed the contents of the transcript as being the truth, he stood by it, obviously there may be some mistakes, but he is prepared to swear in court as to it being a true version of the disk that he had received.

2.12 We also visited his "studio" at his house in Albuquerque and listened to the various disks. After listening and monitoring it on a computer, as well as to the



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disk made at the FBI and comparing it with the disk Mitchell had used to make his transcript, we were of the opinion that Mitchell's disk was a true copy of the original. In other words, we are able to say Mitchell worked off a true copy of the original CVR, when he made his transcript. Mitchell appeared to be an honest and objective person, who had no alternative and ulterior motives. He has previously done work for the DEA, Dept. of Justice, USA Attorney's office and insurance parties.

- 2.13 After listening to certain parts of the disk made at the FBI, it would appear that there are parts of the conversation, that do not appear on the original transcript of the CVR which was made by Dr Jansen. These parts of the conversation appear on the transcript of Mitchell. For example:

- 12.1 " here's the problem "
- 12.2 " Boy George is abroad .....Holy cow"
- 12.3 " What did you say"
- 12.4 " A bomb is"
- 12.5 " Real big problem .....yeah, big problem.....very difficult"
- 12.6 " Kaptein iets om te drink.....No thanks, no thanks"
- 12.7 " We fly in their bomb"



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2.14 Mitchell is of the opinion that there are no women voices on the CVR, although Dr Jansen says there are. Although we can hear, for example " Boy George is aboard" it does not necessary mean ( as the media alleges ) that there is a nuclear bomb on board. In fact, all the aviation people we have spoken to, have never heard the term Boy George nor that it refers to a nuclear bomb. There is also no certainty as to who had uttered the words or in what context.

2.15 Mitchell was not impressed with the enhanced version of the tape which was made by the FBI. According to him all that was done, was that the background noises were reduced but the voices themselves were not improved. Mitchell volunteered to do this and also to try and make a better transcript of the CVR. According to Mitchell, this he will be able to do because the FBI disk of the original CVR tape is of a better quality than the one from which he worked.

2.16 We also visited Rennie Van Zyl in Montreal Canada. He currently works for the International Civil Aviation Organization in the Accident Investigation and Prevention Section. Some of the issues that came out of the meeting with him were:

2.16.1 Boeing and the Directorate of Civil Aviation ( DCA) agreed that the plane broke up at 1500 feet. At the board hearing, Boeing backed away from this because it would reflect badly on the structure of the plane.



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2.16.2 He did not think about making a criminal case regarding the missing ZUR tape. In hindsight he thought this should have been done. He thought that the people in the ZUR were negligent. Etienne Du Toit told him on the Monday after the crash that there was nothing on the ZUR, and as he trusted Du Toit, he did not listen to the tapes. This was never mentioned in the Margo Commission. It was only after a journalist contacted Margo two weeks after the crash that DCA went looking for the tapes.

2.16.3 The ZUR tapes were taken to Micky Mitchell's office at his (Mitchell's) request.

2.16.4 The morning after the crash, the first Safair plane left for Mauritius. Aboard were members of the air force and a member of members from Armscor. They apparently went at the request of SAA.

2.16.5 There was one American passenger aboard the plane and Boeing settled very quickly out of court with the family.

2.16.6 After 30 years in the aviation business, he has never heard of the name "Boy George"



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2.16.7 Neither companies nor passenger's next of kin had filed insurance claims.

2.16.8 The investigation into the companies from Japan, which had cargo aboard, was done very badly. The people who had gone to Japan returned after only two days. Very little was found out about this cargo.

2.16.9 He had the greatest respect for Dr Jansen but there were numerous problems with him. Members of DCA disagreed with Jansen's transcript but he ( Jansen) said that he was the expert. Jansen had a contract with DCA to make the transcript. Whenever he was asked about the transcript, he was always busy with it. At the end of the contract, Jansen wanted to extend the contract. When this was refused, he suddenly produced this transcript.

2.16.10 He decided against looking further for the digital recorder.

2.16.11 The temperature in the cargo compartment had to be about 1000 degree C. He could never establish what had caused this.

2.16.12 Capt. Dawie Uys was in the cockpit the whole time. The voice on the CVR is very soft as though somebody was standing at the cockpit door.



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2.16.13 He never realised that there was a difference in the weight of the cargo on the plane and that reflected on the waybills.

2.16.14 Capt. Snelgar and another person were in the tower at Mauritius and also called the plane. There is, however, none of this on the tape from Mauritius Tower.

2.16.15 There are numerous airlines that transport dangerous cargo.

2.16.16 Judge Margo contacted Minister Louw the morning after the crash to indicated that he was available to head the Inquiry.

### 3 STATEMENTS OBTAINED:

During the investigations the following people were interviewed and information/ statements were obtained.

A summary of some of the statements are reflected hereunder:

#### 3.1 Johanna Maria Magdalena Uys.

She is the wife of Captain Dawie Uys. She has never been approached or made statement before. She knows of one incident where her



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husband was upset because he had to fly with ammunition aboard the plane.

The station master of SAA in London instructed him to fly. He was so scared about this that he posted the cargo list to his home address before the flight.

\* Mrs Uys refused to sign this statement until she receives guarantees that she would not lose her pension etc. from SAA. Her lawyer is a certain Mr Willem Bester, who would seem to be covering for her. Mrs Uys refuses to be seen without him being present, although she is not regarded as a suspect. Mr Bester appears to go out of his way in order to protect her.

**3.2** Jan Hendrick De Wet Lategan.

He was previously a pilot at SAA and knew Dawie Uys well. According to him it is quite possible to transport dangerous cargo without the pilot even knowing about it. The cargo list is submitted to the Captain of the plane for his signature. The Capt. does not check the cargo himself and accepts the load master's word about the cargo. He also supplied names of people who might be able to help in the investigation.

**3.3** Archibald Leon Holder.

He alleged that a certain Rowan Terwin worked for a front company of Armscor and that he knows about the Helderberg.

He also alleged that Judge Margo covered up the true facts of the case.



**3.4 Denis Stephen Cronje:**

He is a retired airline pilot with 26 years service with SAA. He also knew Capt. Dawie Uys. He was never asked to transport dangerous cargo. When he did transport any dangerous cargo, it was within the IATA list. He stated that it is very possible to transport dangerous cargo ( not included in the IATA list) without the Capt. knowing. During the Margo Commission, he asked the Commission to investigate possible involvement of certain companies. The commission said that without hard facts they could do nothing. In a further statement, he stated that he has never heard of the term " Boy George" being used to refer to a nuclear device.

**3.5 Schalk William Davel:**

He is a retired pilot with 37 years experience. He also knew Dawie Uys well. He was on course at the time of the crash and flew to Mauritius a day or two after the crash. Whilst in Mauritius, he spoke to Capt. Jimmy Hippert, also from SAA. Hippert informed him that there was a massive fire aboard the Helderberg and that there were a lot of people from Armscor on the island. They were apparently searching the beaches for something. There was a lot of speculation and/or theories about the crash but they were not properly investigated. He also heard that Uys was unhappy to fly from Taipei because of the cargo but that he was instructed from " higher up" to fly. It was also said that the

Helderberg had problems with its alarm systems and that there were numerous



false fire alarms on the plane. In a further statement, he stated that he has never heard of the term "Boy George" being used to refer to a nuclear device. In case of a fire onboard a plane the term "Snowdrop" is used.

**3.6** Cornelius Hermanus Zacharias Booysen:

He was previously employed at SAA. He was the stand by officer for emergency matters at the time of the crash. He informed both Gert van der Veer and the minister of the crash. He also received two tapes, marked 1 and 2, from Mr le Roux. It was the tapes from the ZUR. These were the tapes with relevance to the Helderberg. He kept the tapes with him. The tapes were later handed over to DCA. About two weeks later, Mr de Klerk from DCA, came to him and they listened to the tapes. It was then that they realized that tape 2 was the wrong tape and nothing about Helderberg was on that tape. The proper tape 2 could not be found because 32 days had elapsed and the tapes were only kept for 30 days. The tape 2 in his possession, was however, correctly marked with the day, date and time thereon.

**3.7** Alan Brian Watkins:

He was employed at SAA for 39 years. He is also a member of the Friends of the Victims of the Helderberg ( FOVOH ). Nine days prior to the crash of the Helderberg, he attended a SAA Management meeting at the Wild Coast Sun.



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He warned the meeting that the carrying of dangerous goods on planes should be addressed. He was aware that military equipment was being transported by SAA, declared on all documents and the manifest as "agricultural implements". In late 1997 he had a meeting with Andre Van Wyk who used to work for SAA. Van Wyk told him that he would never forget a meeting that took place at SAA in Braamfontein shortly after the crash. One person at the meeting remarked that it must have been the "bloody chemicals on the Plane". They were not allowed to leave the meeting until they had signed a document.

3.8 A further statement from Mrs Uys. She, however, strongly denies the contents thereof. It would appear to be a "stratcom" document.

3.9 Yvonne Petra Amy Bellagarda:  
She was the wife of Joe Bellagarda, who was the flight engineer on the Helderberg. She went with Jimmy Mitton ( a close friend and also a flight engineer) to the board of inquiry. She was present when Mitton was summoned to Judge Margo's chambers. On his return he was visibly upset. He told her that Margo insisted that he dropped his line of inquiry. Furthermore, that Margo had said that the country could not afford to have him pursue his line of inquiry. It would cost too much and that his job and career and safety were on



3.10 Terence Devine:

He has not previously made a statement in regard to the Helderberg. He had known Uys for about 10 years prior to his death. Uys had told him about a flight that he had taken from London and that he had become aware that there was dangerous cargo on the plane. He refused to fly but was instructed by "Johannesburg" to fly. He photo-copied the cargo manifest and posted it to his home address.

Prior to Uys' departure for Taipei, he was phoned by Uys and met him at the airport. Uys handed him two envelopes and asked him to send some money to a fellow in America. It was a personal request and did not seem urgent to Devine. After this statement was obtained, further consultations took place with Mr Devine. According to him, he went to the Uys's house the morning that the plane went missing. Mr Bester ( her lawyer- see 3.2 *supra* ) was already at the house as well as one unknown government Minister. He did not meet nor see the Minister, but he did meet Mr Bester. Mr Devine believes that any documentation that Capt Uys forwarded to his house, is in the possession of the lawyer. Shortly after the crash, Mrs Uys had major construction work done to the house, although she always cried poverty. Mrs Jana Uys is Capt. Uys's second wife. He has also met with a certain Mr Brian Slabbert, who is a personal and close friend of Mr Micky Mitchell. Mr Slabbert told him that Mr Mitchell one night told him exactly what had happened to the Helderberg. Mr

Slabbert did not go into detail however.



**3.11 William Herman Van Wyk:**

He is the brother of Neels Van Wyk. During the Helderberg crash, he was employed at SAA. He left in 1991 and in 1992 he went into business with Theunis Jacobs, K C Wu, Louw Fok and David Cochran. The business was called Crown Travel. They lent R 400-000 from K C Wu's mother-in-law to start the business. Jacobs was previously SAA's agent in Taipei and K C Wu worked in the cargo dept. in Taipei. This was during the time of the Helderberg crash. Although they did get a special commission package from SAA, they were not the only ones. Jacob told him that the original cargo manifests were still in his possession.

**3.12 Phillipus Looch:**

He is still a pilot with SAA and has been with them since 1966. In 1985 he flew to Tel Aviv in a SAA plane. Whilst on the ground, his attention was drawn to the fact that a crate had fallen and broken open. What appeared to be a missile was in the crate. This upset him because it was dangerous to fly with a missile on the plane. No investigations were done although he had reported the matter. At a later stage, he was told by Micky Mitchell that Van der Veer, Willemse, another person and himself had been to Armscor about the Tel Aviv matter and that Armscor had given the understanding that nothing like that would happen

again. He also has never heard the term "Boy George" being used to refer to a



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nuclear device.

3.13 Jakob Jan Dekker:

He was employed at Somchem in Somerset West. At the time of the crash, he was an assistant manager in charge of missiles and warheads. Ammonium Perchlorate (AMP) is used as one of the driving forces in missiles. He was not involved in the purchasing of AMP although they used this substance quite a lot. Due to the characteristics of AMP, it would be very dangerous to transport it on an aircraft. AMP can become very unstable and, if it ignites, it can cause extremely high temps.

3.14 Cornelius Christoffel Van Wyk:

He is currently living in the USA. On 1997/02/12 Rennie Van Zyl, Roy Downes and Billy Roets handed over to him what they called the original CVR of the Helderberg. Brendon Farrell of the SABC then made a CD copy of the CVR. The original CVR was handed back to Van Zyl. During February 1999 he handed over this CD disk to Jack Mitchell, who made a transcript thereof.

3.15 James ( Jimmy ) Hippert. He was previously the safety manager at SAA as well as a pilot. He at one stage was asked by our embassy to carry a dangerous parcel but refused. He was taken to task by his superiors at SAA for this.



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- 3.16 Etienne Du Toit. He worked in the ZUR at the time. Mr Du Toit is getting old and has a lot of respect for SAA. He only reconfirms his previous statement in his new statement.
- 3.17 Louis Snyman. He was on duty in the cargo division at JHB airport that evening and found it very strange that an immediate embargo was placed on the cargo manifest that evening. Only certain people had the authority to do this.
- 3.18 Patrick Carolan. He was a Lt Col in the SAAF at the time and was the liaison officer between the SAAF and DCA. According to him there were numerous and unnecessary people sent to Mauritius at the time.
- 3.19 Petrus ( Kallie ) Hillebrand. He also worked at the cargo division at JHB airport at the time. He was very arrogant and even denied that they used computers at that stage. He was not prepared to make a statement and referred me to Adv Karen Kemp of SAA. Adv Kemp was previously the legal clerk to Judge Margo.
- 3.20 Willem Foure. He had sent a letter to us stating that he had information. The man regards himself as a " seener " and alleges that he saw the plane exploded. There was a bomb on board but he could not see where it was placed nor by



3.21 Graham Smith. A former SAA test pilot, who states that it was generally rumoured that the so-called "missing" ZUR tape was given to Gert van der Veer.

#### 4. FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS:

4.1.1 Out of the statements obtained and information received there are numerous people who will have to be seen and their statements obtained. This will have to be done in order for a complete picture to be painted.

4.1.2 Some of the people that will have to be seen, include the following:

4.1.2.1 Gert v d Veer

4.1.2.2 Micky Mitchell

4.1.2.3 Judge Breddar

4.1.2.4 Gavin Dick

4.1.2.5 Deon Storm ( statement just needs to be signed )

4.1.2.6 Piet de Beer

4.1.2.7 Jimmy Mitton

4.1.2.8 Etienne le Roux

4.1.2.9 David Klatzow



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- 4.1.2.10 Brendon Farrell
- 4.1.2.11 Roy Downes
- 4.1.2.12 Billy Roets
- 4.1.2.13 Bertus Cillie
- 4.1.2.14 Pieter Uys
- 4.1.2.15 Piet Smit
- 4.1.2.16 Johan de Bruyn

4.1.3. This list is not a complete list. Whilst we have taken statements and spoken to people, more and more names are coming to the fore. We have recently received from CAA a list of names of people they believe should be interviewed. Some of people, who will have to been seen, are scared as a result of recent media coverage. Some of the people are still pilots flying for other airlines. Although they still resided in South Africa, they spent most of their time overseas. Some of these people, when approached, normally want to consult with their legal representatives. Another problem encountered with these people is that they now stay in various cities and towns within South Africa. Most of them were never approached before ( by the Margo Commission or DCA) and are now wondering why they are now being approached. It takes some time in order to convince these people that it is in the best interest of everybody that they co-operate.



4.1.4 The families of the passengers and crew members are watching the outcome of this investigation very closely. The media and other interested person are also following the matter closely. There is talk of civil action going to take place. Political parties are also following the proceedings as well. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and South African Airways ( SAA) have been approached and had volunteered to help make a transcript of the CVR. However, due to the quality of the CVR and also to other legal problems, they are unable to help. According to information already received, the civil claims to be instituted by family members are based on the transcript of the CVR made by Mitchell. According to sources, members of the families and other interested parties have recently appointed private companies overseas to look into the CVR transcript.

4.1.5 Contact has been made with the representative of the families, Samantha van der Walt. They have established the Helderberg Truth Committee and Dr David Klatzow is the chairman. A meeting with Samantha took place on the understanding that Dr Klatzow not be present. She agreed to this. Incidentally, she lost both her parents on the Helderberg. She and the rest of the committee have pledged to work with us. In fact, Mrs Van der Walt handed over a file full of information which they have collected. There are other files as well. We will be going through this file to see whether it contains new information and whether it can be of any use. It is clear that they have done a large amount of work on the matter and there is a good working relationship between us and



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them.

4.1.5 The one thing that they apparently established is that the Selcal was working at the time. According to the document from Colombo ait traffic control, it was reported that the selcal was normal. This contradicts the earlier versions.

Samantha states that it is very important to speak to Tony Snelgar because he apparently did speak to Dawie Uys. He was in the control tower due to the fact that the plane was late due to the late departure from Taipei.

4.1.6 The CEO of CAA, Mr Trevor Abrahams has taken the CVR and the enhanced FBI version that is on CD disk to the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) in Washington. In a recent telephone call with him in Canada, Mr Abrahams informed us that the NTSB would not be able to make a transcript of the CVR due to the low level of the voices. They were also not willing to certify the original transcript done by Mr Jansen as being a true version of the CVR. The possibility of acquiring the services of a private company within South Africa to try and make an independent transcript of the CVR should, with respect, be looked into. Members of the families were, at your request, invited to accompany Mr Abrahams on this trip at their own expenses. They appreciated the Minister's invitation. However, due to time constraints, the families were not able to send anybody. They are, however, being kept abreast of developments in this regard by Neels Van Wyk, who apparently has a contact



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within NTSB.

4.1.7 Dr Mark Welman from the Rhodes University's Centre for Crime Prevention Studies has also been consulted with. We have met with Dr Welman on several occasions as well as with members of his staff. He has contact with Samantha van der Walt as well. Dr Welman offered, at no cost to us, to help analyse the evidence given at both the Margo Commission as well as at the TRC hearing and also the information received. Dr Welman and his staff have done a lot of work in this regard. We have asked Dr Welman for a report in this regard and he is busy compiling one. He says that it should be ready in a few weeks. Dr Welman has also been in contact with a private International Computer company, which has new software on the market regarding the elimination of sounds and the enhancement of voices. This software costs about R2 million but this company has offered to test the software on a copy of the CVR at no cost to us. This will be done within the next few weeks.

## 5. GENERAL

5.1 Dr Klatzow recently appeared on Radio 702. This was on 2001/8/19. He made serious remarks about the Hon. Minister, Mr Abrahams, Adv Sonn and ourselves.. A copy of the tape was obtained from Radio 702 and forwarded to the Hon. Minister. Dr Klatzow accuses the Minister of not knowing the law, of





CONFIDENTIAL

not keeping promises and dragging his feet. He states that there is more than enough evidence to reopen the enquiry. Dr Klatzow states that certain witnesses were threatened by Judge Margo and that these people have important evidence which is being kept aboard until the Minister reopens the enquiry or failing that the possible civil claims. We may add that it is true that certain people were indeed threatened during the Margo Commission.

5.2 We are in the process of contacting these people and will try get copies of this evidence.

5.3 A further progress report will be forwarded in due course.

  
.....  
ADV J. I. WELCH

  
.....  
MR. M. B. WHALE





## **MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT**

### **MEDIA LIAISON AND CORPORATE COMMUNICATION**

Private Bag X193, PRETORIA, 0001, Room 4111, Forum Building, Struben Street, PRETORIA  
Private Bag X9129, CAPE TOWN, 8000, 120 Plain Street, CAPE TOWN, 8000  
Tel. (012) 309 3331, Fax. (012) 328 3194, E-mail: mpel@ndot.pwv.gov.za  
Tel. (021) 465 7260, Fax. (021) 461 6845,  
Cell-Phone, 082 908 0054

**"Latest Reports On The Helderberg Air Disaster"**

## **MEDIA RELEASE**

**THERE IS NO NEW EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY A RE-OPENING OF  
THE ENQUIRY INTO THE HELDERBERG DISASTER OF 28  
NOVEMBER 1987, SAYS MINISTER OF TRANSPORT, DULAH  
OMAR**

**Friday, October 11, 2002**

No new evidence has emerged which would justify re-opening of the enquiry into the crash of SA 295 (The Helderberg) on 28 November 1987. Therefore, no further commission of enquiry will be appointed or convened for the simple reason that there is no new evidence, which can be placed before such an enquiry.

There have been many allegations such as:

- There were two fires on the Helderberg-one shortly after take off from Taipei information on which was allegedly suppressed,
- A second fire which caused the fatal crash



- Inflammable material was being conveyed by SA 295 in contravention of International prescripts
- The ZUR tape which kept a 24hr record of flight information, was deliberately removed and possibly destroyed
- The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) when enhanced, allegedly contained information which threw new light on the Helderberg disaster

As a result of all these allegations, the Minister of Transport requested the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the Chief Executive Officer of The Civil Aviation Authority to conduct a thorough independent investigation into all the allegations.

The National Director of Public Prosecutions was also requested to interview available potential witnesses.

Adv. J. Welch of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions and Mr. Trevor Abrahams- Chief Executive Officer of the SA Civil Aviation Authority traveled to the United States to ascertain whether the cockpit voice recorder when enhanced threw any new light on the disaster.

The Minister of Transport hereby makes public the report of the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions; Adv. J. Welch dated 8 October 2001. In the report Adv. Welch mentions all the persons who were interviewed.

He also reports on the cockpit voice recorder, the transcript made of it and the enhanced version of the tape made by the F.B.I. He also comments on the ZUR tape, which went missing.

On receipt of report from Adv. Welch of 8 October 2001, the Minister of Transport requested Adv. Welch to locate the persons who had still not been interviewed and to interview them. Their names are mentioned in the report. The Minister has received a further report from Adv. Welch, dated 20 September 2002 indicating that he had interviewed most of the persons (those who were available). He comes to the conclusion that no new evidence has emerged which could be placed before a tribunal or commission for consideration.



In the light of all the information currently available, the Minister of Transport comes to the conclusion that to set up another commission of enquiry will be entirely futile in that there is no evidence available, which can be placed before such an enquiry, which will throw a different light on the Helderberg disaster.

The legal representatives of relatives of the victims have on a number of occasions approached the Minister. They were invited to submit to the Minister statements from persons who according to their knowledge can throw new light on the disaster. No such statements have been forthcoming.

The reports of Adv. Welch dated 21 May 2001, 8 October 2001 and 20 September 2002 was all placed before Cabinet. Cabinet has endorsed the view of the Minister of Transport that there exists no basis for re-opening the enquiry.

The Minister of Transport will continue to monitor the situation. He fully appreciates the trauma of relatives of victims and once again conveys condolences to them.

The Minister knows that families want closure but above all they want to know the truth. Whilst therefore, the matter is closed for the present from the point of view of Government, the Minister will continue to monitor the situation and should any new evidence become available he will assess it.

The Minister appeals to those who claim that there is new evidence to place before an enquiry to submit statements to the Minister, who will consider them on their merit. He cannot however reconvene a commission of enquiry purely on the basis of allegations and suspicions.

The reports submitted by the National Director of Public Prosecutions office are being made public, and they can be accessed on the Department's web site, [www.transport.gov.za](http://www.transport.gov.za).

Issued by: Innocent Mpe  
Deputy Manager: Media Liaison  
Tel: 012 309 3331  
Cell: 082 508 0054  
Fax: 012 309 3925  
[mpei@ndot.gov.za](mailto:mpei@ndot.gov.za)  
October 11, 2002





Mnr. Thomas Osler ... vrae oor sy bande met Krygkor.

Philip de Bruin

**D**ie reaksie om die vraag op die Helderberg toe dit in November 1987 in die Indiese Oseaan neergestort het, het gister verdiep nadat dit bekend geword het dat 'n vooraanstaande sakeman op die vlug kiasatydlik noue bande met Krygkor gehad het.

Mnr. Thomas Osler was na bewering 'n agent van Krygkor, hoewel hy amptelik as hoofbestuurder van die Nywerheidsontwikkelingskorporasie (NOK) op die vlug was. Hy was goed bekend aan verskeie destydse ministers.

Die onthulling kom nadat Beeld gister die volledige transkripte gepubliseer het wat in Amerika van 'n gedeelte van die Helderberg se vlug-opnemer gemaak is. Die gedeelte van 'n gesprek tussen bemanningslede was voorheen nie ontwar nie. Volgens die transkripte het die Helderberg se vlieënier, kap. Dawie Uys, aan sy bemanning gesê daar is 'n kernbom in die vragruim.

Osler se moontlike bande met Krygkor was lank 'n geheim. In die hoogs geheime sitting van die Waarheid- en Versoeningskommissie oor die Helderberg-ramp twee jaar gelede is daar volgens 'n ingeligte egter "pertinente vrae gestel" oor sy verhouding met Krygkor en die vermoedelik dat hy as agent vir Krygkor optree.

Die reaksie op die vraag of Osler 'n agent van Krygkor was, het gister verdiep nadat dit bekend geword het dat 'n vooraanstaande sakeman op die vlug kiasatydlik noue bande met Krygkor gehad het.

## ● Sakeman wat 'SA yster oorsee gaan verkoo

# Krygkor-konno

Volgens Beeld se inligting het Os-



**Nog berigte op bl. 4**

Die oggend van die Helderberg se vertrek van Taiwan was die sakeman in Singapoer. Hy is om 'n onverklaarbare rede in 'n Taiwanese militêre vliegtuig in Singapoer gaan haal en na Taiwan gebring.

"Hy het 'n Britse paspoort gehad en kon dus maklik in daardie dae waar in Suid-Afrikaners nie in van die lande toegelaat is nie daarheen gaan."

Wat Osler se bewegings kort voor die ramp op Taiwan se gewilligheid om hom in 'n militêre vliegtuig te vervoer nog meer raaiselagtig maak, is die feit dat hy aan vriende en familielede gesê het hy gaan oorsee om "Suid-Afrikaanse yster te verkoop".

Sy vrou, Yvonne, het gister uit Kaapstad, waar sy vakansie hou, gesê sy was onder die indruk dat haar man yster of staal aan verskeie lande sou probeer verkoop.

"Ek weet niks van sy moontlike Krygkor-bande nie. Ek is ook nooit ingelig dat dit in die WVK se sitting oor die Helderberg geopper is nie."

Osler, wat 'n graad in meganiese ingenieurswese gehad het, het noue bande met die regering gehad. Hy was tot in 1987 hoofbestuurder van die Sentrale Energiefonds en ook voorsitter van twee vol filiale van die NOK, Atlantis Aluminium en Atlantis Sweepers. Hy het wêreldwyd goeie kontakte in nywerheids- en energiekringe gehad.

● Beeld het gister vasgestel dat Krygkor in 'n verklaring aan die destydse Margo-kommissie van ondersoek gesê het Krygkor het geen vraag op die vlug van 30 November 1987 gehad het nie. Die Helderberg het egter twee dae vroeër, op 28 November, neergestort.

● Mnr. Trevor Abrahams, uitvoerende hoof van die burgerlugvaartowerheid, het gisteroggend gesê hy is ook nou in die besit van die verbeterde transkripte uit Amerika.

"Net die tyd sal nou leer hoe waar en wanneer ons die korrektheid van die transkripte gaan bepaal."



**Kryg**

Mnr. Thomas Oaler . . .  
vrae oor sy  
bande met  
Krygkor.

Philip de Bruin

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"Ek word egter deur 'n eed van geheimhouding verbied om verder hieroor te praat," het die ingeligte gesê.

Volgens

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Nog ber  
op bl. 4

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# Sending na VSA kom dalk

Phillip de Bruin 25/5/2000

Mnr. Dullah Omar, minister van vervoer, het opdrag gegee dat die ondersoekwerk na die jongste onthullings oor die Helderberg as "eerste en hoogste prioriteit" deur sy departement en die burgerlugvaartowerheid gehanteer word.

Mnr. Mike Mabaso, Omar se woordvoerder, het gister gesê die minister beskou die verwikkelings om die Helderberg as "uiters belangrik" en wil so gou moontlik in staat gestel word om 'n besluit te neem oor die heropening van die ondersoek na die ramp.

Beeld verneem betroubaar dat die moontlikheid nie uitgesluit is nie dat 'n Suid-Afrikaanse afvaardiging nog die naweek na Nieu-Mexiko in Amerika sal vertrek om self daar na die band en transkripsie te gaan luister wat 'n Amerikaanse forensiese kenner, mnr. Jack Mitchell, ontleed het.

Die Helderberg het in November 1987 tydens 'n vlug van Taiwan na Johannesburg naby Mauritius met 150 mense aan boord in die Indiese Oseaan neergestort.

Beeld het in die laaste dae verskeie onthullings oor die Helderberg gedoen. Onder meer is die volledige nuwe transkripsie van die vlugopnemer gepubliseer waaruit dit blyk dat die Helderberg 'n kernbom aan boord gehad het.

Mabaso het gesê die hele Helderberg-kwessie word op 'n "bale, bale dringende grondslag" deur die departement van vervoer gehanteer sonder 'n ingeligte beslissing" oor 'n nuwe ondersoek gedoen kan word. "Ek kan jou waarborg die minister sal 'n noodlottig huiwer om die ondersoek te heropen as die getuïenis

Intussen was daar gister verskeie nuwe verwikkelings om die Helderberg-ramp:

- Beeld het gesaghebbend verneem dat Taiwan in 1987 gewerk het aan 'n ballistiese missiel, genaamd Skyhorse.

- Suid-Afrika het baie daarin belang gestel en het reeds vroeg in 1987 begin om die Skyhorse saam met Taiwan te ontwikkel.

- Baie vrae word gestel oor 'n baie geheime ontmoeting wat die vlieënier van die Helderberg, kapt. Dawie Uys, met mnr. Quinton van Tonder, destyds 'n meganiese inspekteur in die departement van openbare werke, gehad het.

Mnr. A.M. Ferreira, destyds hoofinspekteur, was by toe Uys by Van Tonder opgedaag het. "Hy is aan my voorgestel as die vlieënier kapt. Dawie Uys. Kapt. Uys het aan my gesê dat hy binne dae op 'n belangrike sending na Taiwan vertrek. Hy het die woorde belangrike sending gebruik.

"Daarna het hy en mnr. Van Tonder sowat 'n uur lank agter geslote deure vergader."

- Sowel mnr. Gert van der Veer, bestuurshoof van die SAL tydens die ramp, en mnr. Vernon Nadel, wat die nag van die ramp in beheer van die kommunikasiekamer op die destydse Jan Smuts-lughawe was, het gister 'n sluler van geheimhouding getrek oor wat dié nag gebeur het.

Selfs die mees basiese vrae wou hulle nie beantwoord nie. Nadel het volstaan met: "Ek het klaar voor die WVK getuig," en Van der Veer met: "Geen kommentaar."

- Me. Minah Sindane, senior bestuurder van openbare betrekkinge by Krygkor, het na aanleiding van 'n berig gister in Beeld oor mnr. Thomas (Barry) Oaler - wat vermoedelik 'n Krygkor-agent was en wat ook in die ramp gesterf het - gesê Krygkor se afdeling teenintelligensie het "geen rekord" van mnr. Oaler nie.



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$BZ, P_3$ 

## Helderberg-ramp

**LUKAS MEYER**  
Hoofdverslaggever

CHIVE FOR JUSTICE



"Dick het kort ná die ramp vertel dat 'iemand van bo' geweer het dat

● Mnr. Dullah Omar, Minister van Vervoer, sé indien daar genoeg getuigenis met meriete is, sal hy die ondersoek na die ramp heropen. 'n Aanbeveling in dié verband kan binne twee weke aan die Kabinet vir beslissing voorgelê word.

## LUKAS MEYER

Van Zyl skryf in die  
reder 'n onderhou-



JOANNE Smethers  
Melanie Gosting.

To: Dr. Klatzko.  
(021-422 4476.)

From: S. von Caenen  
(082 499 7843.)

Date: 2003-12-03

Subject: STATEMENTS: Tanna Up.

- 1) Attached please find statements as discussed with Adv. Weck.
- 2) Thank you.

  
S.V. von Caenen



Narrag 581

A-7

SAF/1000/1997

**JOHANNA MARIA MAGDALENA UYS**

Identiteitsnommer 550101 0075 007

verklaar in Afrikaans en onder Eed:

1.

Ek is die weduwee van Kaptein Dawie Uys wat die vlieënier was van die rangvliegruig Helderberg wat op 28 November 1987 in die Indiese Oseaan gestort het.

2.

Hiervoor is die eerste verklaring wat ek al in verband met die oortre van my eggenoot en die passasiers en bemanning van die Helderberg. Ek het nie voorheen aan iemand van amptelike wettige verklaring gemaak nie.

3.

Ek het ook nie verklaringe aan die media gemaak nie. My prokureur, Meneer Willem Bester het al my sake behartig.

4.

Ek is op 8 Augustus 1997 deur Dr. Pretorius en Superintendent Venter uitgevra oor my oortrede eggenoot se kennis en gewoontes van sy vliegskopbeaan.

5.

Ek was 'n lugwaardin in diens van die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugdiens vanaf ... tot ... ber ... talle binnelandse en buitelandse vlugte saam met my oortrede eggenoot



2

5.

Hy het sy werk ernstig opgevat. Hy was 'n versigtige en ervare loots. Ek onthou dat hy 'n aantal jare voor die ramp ongelukkig was oor die vraag van 'n vliegtuig wat saam met passasiers vervoer sou word vanaf Londen. Ek is nie seker oor die presiese woorde nie maar wat ek my wel herinner is dat hy gesê het dat hy nie daarvan hou om ammunisie saam met passasiers te vervoer nie. By hierdie geleentheid was hy so ongelukkig oor die toedrag van sake dat hy die vraagstukke of te wete die manifeste aan hom self gegee het by sy adres in Suid-Afrika.

7.

Hy het blykbaar opdrag van die Sakebevoerder gekry om te vlieg, ondanks sy besware. Hy het die manifeste later deur die pos by die huis ontvang. Hy het een aand link in sy studeerkamer met die manifeste dokument gesit.

8.

Dit sal moontlik wees om hierdie insident op te spoor, aangesien daar 'n skriftelike verslag van opsigte van enige so 'n insident gelaas moet word by die Ops kamer. Kaptein Dok Mahan was op daardie stadium in beheer van die Ops kamer. 'n Verdere persoon wat hieroor in kontak kan word is meneer Jan Lategan wie tans woon in Smithfield. Dit was nie die enigste keer wat hy ongelukkig was oor die vraag nie. Die Ops kamer was 'n klein ou geboujie net oorkant die Holiday Inn-hotel. Dit was 'n soort van 'n beheerkamer waar vooraf inligting verskaf is. Dit was nie deel van die hoofgebou nie.

9.

Jan Lategan het die persoon wat na bewering deur die Lugdiens op 'n plaas opgesit is in die Kaap, gaan besoek. Hierdie persoon het blykbaar iets te doen gehad met die verdwyning van bande.

10.

Na die Margo ondersoek het 'n ene Piet Taljaard, vermoedelik die voorsitter van die Vryheidswaardiging kom my probeer kontak maak. Ek het dit vermy omdat ek nie gelukkig oor die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugdiens gevoel het nie.



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11.

Insgelyks het ek gepoog om my oorlede man se logboek wat detail oor al sy vlugte bevat op te spoor dog sonder enige sukses.

12.

Daar was ook 'n senior vlieënier, 'n ene Jimmy Hippert wat namens die Lugdiens by dié ondersoek betrokke was. Net voor hy kon getuig is hy egter oorgeplaas of weggestuur na Air Sir gapoer toe.

13.

Ek is vertrouwd met die inhoud van hierdie verklaring en begryp dit.  
Ek het geen beswaar teen die aflê van die voorgeskrewe eed nie.  
Ek beskou die voorgeskrewe eed as bindend vir my gewete.

---

JOHANNA MARIA MAGDALENA UYS

Ek sertifiseer dat bostaande verklaring deur my afgeneem is en dat die verklaarder erken dat sy vertrouwd is met die inhoud van hierdie verklaring en dit begryp. Hierdie verklaring is voor my beëdig en verklaarder se handtekening is in my teenwoordigheid daarop aangebring

---

KOMMISSARIS VAN EDE  
DAVID SCHALK VENTER  
SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIEDIEN S  
SPESIALE ONDERSOEKSPAN VAN DIE  
PROKUREUR-GENERAAL TRANSVAAL  
MIELIERAAD GEBOU: 2DE VLOER  
BELVEDERESTRAAT 903  
ARCADIA  
SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT



Nawaag SBI  
Reviewed Paul Kirk  
28/8/98

A-8

I, Janna Uys, the widow of SAA pilot Dawie Uys who captained the Helderberg aircraft that crashed into the sea off the coast of Mpumalanga state the following.

1. Dawie contacted me moments before taking off complaining he was being forced to carry an extremely dangerous chemical containing Ammonia. He informed me that he did not want to take off with the cargo but that he had two options, either be fired and lose his pension or fly the cargo and receive a very large cash bonus on landing it.

2. He told me the chemical had arrived on a plane from Japan and that it had been unloaded from that plane in conditions of absolute secrecy and loaded onto his in conditions of massive and irregular secrecy.

3. He informed me that it was not the first time he was being forced to carry dangerous cargo, but that this was exceptionally dangerous.

4. He informed me that he would not have the equipment on board to deal with the chemical should it explode or ignite.

5. Although the conversation was conducted over a telephone line that was extremely crackly Dawie told me a man called Zeeberg of Zeeberg firm Pretoria was the man who ordered the cargo be flown. I assumed he worked for the government but on reflection he may have worked for Armscor. Whichever way Dawie told me he was in Pretoria. Someone in Taiwan who was working for SAA relayed these orders to Dawie.

6. Dawie told me he was phoning from a public phone outside a ladies toilet as he feared someone would listen in if he phoned from any offices. He said he feared this as he had been warned to keep absolutely quiet and not even mention the cargo over the radio. Should he do so Dawie told me he would be fired and lose his pension.

7. Around two hours before the Helderberg crash was announced two men arrived at my home. This was very early in the morning, but I am not sure when.



8 The men said they were from the police but were not in uniform. They arrived in a white BMW. They were very well spoken and sympathetic. They apologized profusely for waking me but said they had terrible news.

9 When they told me the Helderberg had crashed and there were no survivors I realized what had happened and became hysterical. I threatened them and said I knew about the cargo. One of the two men immediately left my home and went to the car.

10 The one left behind assured me the cargo was not the cause of the accident but said a wing had sheared off. He told me that a "very slightly dangerous" cargo was on board but that this was in no way the cause of the accident.

11 Around five minutes after going to his car the other man returned to the home and sat down. He told his colleague the boss was on his way.

12 A man from the Security Police then arrived, but again he did not have any identification. I saw that he arrived in a very big Mercedes Benz.

13 He told me that what I knew could ruin SAA, ruin the economy and play right into the hands of the ANC.

14 He told me that while a dangerous cargo was on board the plane it was, in no way the cause of the accident. He told me the wing sheared off the plane and that was why it crashed.

15 He told me his bosses would be furious if I told anyone about the phone call. He told me I would be taken care of for life and that I would never want for anything.

16 He told me that if however I did tell of the phone call I would lose my pension and that everyone would think I was only a crazy woman.

17 After thinking this through for some time I realized I had to agree with them.



18 I know my telephone was tapped until very recently. If all my neighbors phones were off, mine would still work. Often if my phone broke the Post Office would be repairing it before I even reported it broken. I also often heard clicking mechanical noises on the phone and, once when I went on holiday I know I was followed as the same car was behind me all the way to Durban.

19 I know I was often followed as at all times of the day and night cars, bakkies and vans would be parked near my home. If ever I went anywhere they would stay parked but I could often see people in them. After driving out my street I would be followed, sometimes very obviously. Other times they may not have followed me, either that or they hid themselves well.

20 I ha

David - this is the letter I told you about.

I am not sure how authentic it is. All I do know is that it definitely has its origins with the NIS/NIA.

I was sitting in the office of an ex Security Branch cop when he phoned a friend of his in the NIA and had this e-mailed to him.

The name Zeeberg is not correct - it should be Zeedeberg who was then M.D. of Armscor.

Having said the letter may be a plant I have no idea why it would be faked. It hardly advances or promotes the NIS.

Paul





Enq: SSI Von Caues  
Tel: 082 499 7843  
Ref: 8/10 (DSO OPS)

The Honourable Mr AM Omar  
Minister of Transport  
National Department of Transport  
Pretoria  
0001

Dear Minister Omar

## FEEDBACK REPORT: HELDERBERG PLANE DISASTER.

1. Previous preliminary report dated 2001-10-08 with similar heading refers.
2. During this continuous investigation the following individuals were consulted and/or interviewed in an attempt to receive more confirmed information or relevant evidence regarding this investigative enquiry namely:

### 2.1. Mr. Johan deWaal:

He is the SAA Director of Protection Services at the Johannesburg International Airport. Mr De Waal was interviewed in an attempt to trace Mr Tony Snelgar in Singapore. To date Mr De Waal could however not report any detailed information on Mr Snelgar.

### 2.2. Mr Chung:

Mr Chung is the station manager at Singapore Airlines. He was also interviewed and requested (verbally and in writing) to provide the investigation team with the whereabouts of Mr Snelgar. No cooperation was received in this attempt to trace Mr Snelgar.


### 2.3. Advocate Willem Bester:

Adv Bester is the legal representative of Ms. Jana Uys, widow of the late Captain Dawie Uys. He was approached in order to assist Ms. Jana Uys during a planned interview. However Adv Bester informed Adv Welch that his client Ms Uys, does not want to be interviewed or assist this investigation in any way. Apparently her reasons were personal and she felt that the matter had been dealt with and must be laid to rest.

### 2.3. Mr Mickey Mitchell:

He was the SAA Chief Director Operations during the Helderberg disaster. According to Mr Mitchell he was at home when the operations tower phoned him and informed him of the disaster. He then went to the operational tower, ZUR. He consequently phoned Mr Viv Lewis second in charge, who then contacted the CEO, Mr Gert van der Veer. Mr van der Veer also then went to the ZUR. Mr Mitchell indicated that he did not attempt to make radio contact with the Helderberg due to the fact that according to the radio communications logbook, it was not

2009/04/03





Office of the Head Operational Support Division

Pretoria



Enq: SSI Von Caues  
Tel: 082 499 7843  
Ref: 8/10 (DSO OPS)

The Honourable Mr AM Omar  
Minister of Transport  
National Department of Transport  
Pretoria  
0001

Dear Minister Omar

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necessary. He also indicated that top officials were in the ZUR. However he cannot remember who had been present at that time. All procedures were followed at that time according to IATA.

Mr Mitchell could not comment on the exact detail when the Helderberg crashed or "went down". Furthermore he could not comment on the theories regarding the two oil spill debris fields and the two fire scenarios on board of the plane. He also indicated that he does not know what happened to the ZUR tapes that recorded the plane disaster. Mr Mitchell stated that at no given time would a SAA captain endanger the lives of his passengers, even if an instruction was given from a government minister to fly dangerous goods.

He further indicated that Captain Dawie Uys was an experienced pilot whom knew the safety procedures very well.

Mr Mitchell also indicated that the words "Boy George" have no meaning to him in the flying environment.

#### 2.4. Mr Gert van der Veer:

Mr van der Veer was the SAA CEO during the Helderberg plane disaster. He indicated that during the apartheid years it was necessary for him to make use of "survival techniques" to keep SAA operational at that stage. This was due to sanctions. He indicated that he offered countries especially in the East, on the Taiwan route, money for landing rights. He furthermore arranged technical assistance to Far East countries in order to allow SAA to land in the respective countries.

Mr van der Veer also indicated that no dangerous goods had been transported on any SAA plane. The IATA regulations were adhered to due to the fact that he had a "business" to manage and could not afford any other problems within SAA at that stage.

He stated that it was a fire, which caused the aeroplane to crash, and that fires on board of aeroplanes are not an abnormal phenomenon. He also stated that the aeroplane could have broken in half in the air due to the fire and/or serve weight. According to Mr van der Veer an aeroplane from Lufthansa airlines also broke in half at the Kenya airport.

Mr van der Veer acknowledged the fact that he had a working relationship with the National Intelligence Service and the South African Police at that stage due to security and safety reasons.

He also indicated that Captain Dawie Uys was an excellent pilot who done everything according to the book.

#### 2.5. Dr David Klatzow:

Dr Klatzow is an independent forensic consultant who did extensive research on the Helderberg air disaster. During this interview Dr Klatzow mostly disputed and argued the issuing of section 205 summonses according to the Criminal Procedure Act.

He further explained all his theories and findings, although it was not based on relevant criminal facts or evidence.

Dr Klatzow indicated that he would assist in our investigation if he could receive the "Welch reports" to minister Omar with regards to the investigation. It was agreed that he could receive the reports for his information only.

#### 2.6. Ms Samantha van der Walt:

Ms van der Walt lost both her parents in the air disaster. She is a representative for the friends of the Helderberg (FOVH). She accompanied Dr Klatzow to the indicated place where the plane crashed. She did not report any new information she also agreed to assist with the investigation.



With regards to the interviews that took place, the following investigative elucidation could be made, namely

3.1 No confirmed information regarding Mr Tony Snelgar was received. Officials from the CAA made contact with him but no relevant questions were put to Mr Snelgar with regards to the Helderberg disaster.

More attempts were made to trace Mr Snelgar who is an important potential witness in this investigative enquiry. However it will be a great financial expenditure for government to travel to Singapore in an attempt to trace Mr Snelgar.

3.2 Adv Sias Reynecke who apparently works for TRANSNET assisted both Mr Mitchell and Mr van der Veer. Adv Reynecke indicated that he is the legal representative for the two said individuals and that TRANSNET has a monitoring role to play in this investigation.

It was said during both mentioned interviews that Mr van der Veer and Mr Mitchell do not want to make any new statements and that they will abide with their statements made to the TRC.

It should be mentioned that Mr van der Veer as the CEO for the SAA during the stage of this air disaster did not testify before the Margo Commission.

3.3 Dr. Klatzow was again approach for assistance after the mentioned interview. He then raised the matter that he will assist if government can give him a financial budget to do further investigations into the Helderberg disaster. No promises were made to Dr Klatzow as well as no assistance was received from him up until now.

3.4. All relevant statements were copied and send to the CEO of the CAA for their assessment.

4. The investigation team is in a process of contacting Mr Judge Breddar,

Mr Peter de Beer and Mr JJ van Rooyen. Continuous arrangements to gather more information and evidence are still taking place.

5. A further report will be forwarded in due course.

Adv JI Welch  
Deputy Director: Public Prosecutions  
Head: Operational Support





**MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT  
MEDIA LIAISON AND CORPORATE COMMUNICATION**

Private Bag X193, PRETORIA, 0001, Room 4111, Forum Building, Struben Street, PRETORIA  
Private Bag X9129, CAPE TOWN, 8000, 120 Plein Street, CAPE TOWN, 8000  
Tel. (012) 309 3331, Fax. (012) 328 3194, E-mail: mpei@dot.gov.za  
Tel. (021) 465 7260, Fax. (021) 461 6845,  
Cell-Phone, 082 908 0054

*"Latest Reports on the Helderberg Air Disaster"*

**There is no new evidence to justify a re-opening of the Enquiry into  
the Helderberg Disaster of 28 November 1987, says Minister of  
Transport, Dullah Omar**

11 October 2002

No new evidence has emerged which would justify re-opening of the enquiry into the crash of SA 295 (The Helderberg) on 28 November 1987. Therefore, no further commission of enquiry will be appointed or convened for the simple reason that there is no new evidence, which can be placed before such an enquiry.

There have been many allegations such as:

- There were two fires on the Helderberg-one shortly after take off from Taipei information on which was allegedly suppressed,
- A second fire which caused the fatal crash
- Inflammable material was being conveyed by SA 295 in contravention of International prescripts
- The ZUR tape which kept a 24hr record of flight information, was deliberately removed and possibly destroyed
- The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) when enhanced, allegedly contained information which threw new light on the Helderberg disaster


As a result of all these allegations, the Minister of Transport requested the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the Chief Executive Officer of The Civil Aviation Authority to conduct a thorough independent investigation into all the allegations

The National Director of Public Prosecutions was also requested to interview available potential witnesses.

Adv. J. Welch of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions and Mr. Trevor Abrahams- Chief Executive Officer of the SA Civil Aviation Authority traveled to the United States to ascertain whether the cockpit voice recorder when enhanced threw any new light on the disaster.

The Minister of Transport hereby makes public the report of the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, Adv. J. Welch dated 8 October 2001. In the report Adv. Welch mentions all the persons who were interviewed.

He also refers to the cockpit voice recorder, the transcript made of it and the enhanced version of it. He also comments on the ZUR tape, which went missing.





On receipt of report from Adv. Welch of 8 October 2001, the Minister of Transport requested Adv. Welch to locate the persons who had still not been interviewed and to interview them. Their names are mentioned in the report. The Minister has received a further report from Adv. Welch, dated 20 September 2002, indicating that he had interviewed most of the persons (those who were available). He comes to the conclusion that no new evidence has emerged which could be placed before a tribunal of commission for consideration.

In the light of all the information currently available, the Minister of Transport comes to the conclusion that to set up another commission of enquiry will be entirely futile in that there is no evidence available which can be placed before such an enquiry, which will throw a different light on the Helderberg disaster.

The legal representatives of relatives of the victims have on a number of occasions approached the Minister. They were invited to submit to the Minister statements from persons who according to their knowledge can throw new light on the disaster. No such statements have been forthcoming.

The reports of Adv. Welch dated 21 May 2001, 8 October 2001 and 20 September 2002 was all placed before Cabinet. Cabinet has endorsed the view of the Minister of Transport that there exists no basis for re-opening the enquiry.

The Minister of Transport will continue to monitor the situation. He fully appreciates the trauma of relatives of victims and once again conveys condolences to them.

The Minister knows that families want closure but above all they want to know the truth. Whilst therefore, the matter is closed for the present from the point of view of Government, the Minister will continue to monitor the situation and should any new evidence become available he will assess it.

The Minister appeals to those who claim that there is new evidence to place before an enquiry to submit statements to the Minister, who will consider them on their merit. He cannot however reconvene a commission of enquiry purely on the basis of allegations and suspicions.

The reports submitted by the National Director of Public Prosecutions office are being made public, and they can be accessed on the Department's web site, [www.transport.gov.za](http://www.transport.gov.za)

Issued by: Innocent Mpe  
Media Liaison  
Tel: 012 309 3331  
Cell: 082 908 0054  
Fax: 012 309 3925  
Email: [mpel@dot.gov.za](mailto:mpel@dot.gov.za)



my Armscor to  
the Press Ambul.

Add ARMSCOR ACTION PLAN  
1

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Complaint No. 2.2.

"Helmie Snyman, Armscor's director of finance, was found dead in Pretoria with a bullet wound to his head..... His family believe he was murdered.....but police said he committed suicide."

#### POSSIBLE STRATEGY

1. Armscor challenges several assertions made by WeekendStar in the published material which gives rise to this complaint. Our broad strategy should be, in effect, to reopen the Snyman inquest.
2. We may be wrong on some relatively minor points, -- ie:
  - a) His job title (General Manager: Finance, not Director).
  - b) The fact that it was an inquest, not the police, who ruled it suicide (but surely it was the police that provided the evidence that allowed the court to reach such a finding?)
  - c) Whether or not he was in charge of "secret foreign procurement". (But Armscor would deny that, wouldn't it?).
3. Some claimed errors are serious: like the question of missing papers and his son allegedly being present when his office safe was opened. Armscor claims an affidavit (from Mr C J Hoffman) on this issue.
4. But members of his family believe to this day he was murdered. One, at least, is ready to give evidence. The inquest, apparently, was perfunctory, no member of the family called to describe his state of mind.
5. We should concentrate on this real mystery and not get bogged down in dubious detail.
6. We have a family member prepared to give evidence. He has a startling and sinister story to tell about Snyman's last departure from home. This is where our focus should be.



## ACTION

1. Obtain record of Snyman inquest. Was it perfunctory? Were there unusual features about its timing or procedures? Did any family member give evidence? Who were the witnesses? What precisely did they say? Try to establish a cover-up. Prepare transcript for submission to the Press Council.
2. Obtain affidavit from daughter describing her father's cheerful departure from home. (20 minutes later he "killed himself"). Arrange for her to give evidence to the Press Council.
3. Investigate claim that Snyman son was present when Snyman's office safe was opened. Check out Hoffman affidavit. What is son's version? Armscor implies that the safe was opened twice -- once in front of his son, once when his successor took over. Why would his son be present? Is that unusual?
4. Revert to original sources to obtain confirmatory (and probably confidential?) evidence that they were correctly quoted. Prepare statement for Press Council from David Allen confirming his knowledge of the existence of such informants, their standing and the nature of their allegations.
5. Track down former friends or colleagues who may have views on whether Snyman was suicidal or not.
6. Try to confirm that Snyman had something to do with secret procurements.
7. Check Press coverage at the time of death and inquest.
8. Check whether Cameron Commission evidence offers any support for the murder theory.

## POSSIBLE WITNESSES

1. Snyman's son, daughter.
2. Former friends and colleagues.



How Herson 'Plan S

## POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES

1. Armscor denies the following specific statements by WeekendStar:

- a) That Snyman was in charge of "secret foreign procurement".
- b) That files and tapes disappeared;
- c) That his death was ruled a suicide by a "judicial inquiry" not the police.

2. We should avoid, if we can, too much debate on those issues.

more

drawn  
by



✓ Add ACTION PLAN 4

### Complaint No. 2.3

"Secret Armscor documents contain a diplomatic bombshell .... 1989 and 1993 versions of Log 17 reveal that any frequency-hopping equipment sold to African countries ..... should be equipped only with specified electronic parts....This would have made it easier to monitor, intercept or jam their transmissions."

### POSSIBLE STRATEGY

1. Armscor insists in its response that the failure to verify was "particularly irresponsible as the report itself points to the consequences this allegation could have."
2. Our lawyers believe that WeekendStar has a strong response to this complaint.
3. Therefore the strategy should be to emphasise Armscor's own assessment of the importance of this complaint -- before demolishing it.
4. It will be important to make this demolition as detailed and authoritative as possible.

### ACTION, POSSIBLE WITNESSES, POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES;

To be identified by Webber Wentzel.

me



(Add ACTION PLAN 5)

## Complaint 2.4

"Armcor's frantic scramble for technology, spare parts and components..... turned some of its procurement officers into international criminals."

### POSSIBLE STRATEGY

1. Armcor's opening response is: "The statement that some employees of Armcor are international criminals is untrue."
2. The categoric nature of the reply opens the way to another exhaustive response from WeekendStar.
3. Armcor hints that it will take refuge in technicalities:
  - a) "No employee of Armcor has ever been convicted in any international court of law for criminal behaviour."
  - b) "This statement implies that criminal offences have been perpetrated ..... Court records should therefore exist of such conduct."
4. The possibility (likelihood?) is that Armcor will claim that it dispensed with such people so expeditiously that they were no longer Armcor employees by the time their nefarious deeds were exposed.
5. This must be quickly and effectively rejected for the sophistry it is. The WeekendStar claim must surely refer to anyone who has committed offences in his capacity as an Armcor employee, whether past or present.
6. Once this point is won, the way is open to refer back to relevant examples arising in Complaint One.
7. But even if the point is denied, Armcor spokesmen have condemned themselves in their own public statements down the years:
  - a) Armcor spokesman concedes that dangerous chemicals might have been smuggled aboard scheduled passenger flights by individuals exceeding their brief - a crime.
  - b) Fred Bell statement: "We will fight dirty".



8. International law has been flouted repeatedly. Arms deals, secret shipments, disguised cargo (eg AK-47s) promoting destabilisation in Africa, arming Angolan rebels, etc etc..

9. The most direct and obvious example of an Armscor criminal: The employee at the Cameron Commission who declines to answer questions on the grounds he may incriminate himself. In his own eyes, at least, he is a criminal.

## ACTION

1. Prepare argument that WeekendStar statement on "international criminals" must refer to anyone who committed criminal acts in their Armscor capacity.
2. Research newspaper files for relevant examples.
3. Appoint American and British correspondent to research allegations of illegal Armscor activity. Check especially for formal inquiries and government/political statements.
4. Analyse Complaint 2.1 responses for relevant information. (ie, Coventry Four, etc etc).
5. Check Press reports on Armscor disciplinary hearings against employees.

## POSSIBLE WITNESSES

To be identified by Chandler

## POSSIBLE WEAKNESSES

1. Armscor winning the argument that WeekendStar must prove existing "international criminals" in Armscor.

2. The fallback position - if Point One happens - must be made stronger.

more



Add Action Plans 7

## CONCLUSION

1. We are fortunate that the first four complaints on the Armscor list are sufficiently broad and sweeping to enable us to establish a foundation for accusing Armscor of proven dubious and despicable actions.
2. This should help us create a climate in which the public will not think it unreasonable or irresponsible for WeekendStar to have given greater credence to other allegations, especially where corroborated.
3. All energy must, initially at least, be directed to making our response to the first four complaints as articulate and convincing as possible.

thos



INSTITUTE FOR MARITIME TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTDCURRENT CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Currency: Rand

Incorporated on: 30/04/1987  
Trading Commenced: 01/01/1987  
Auditors: COOPERS & LYBRAND

PRINCIPALS

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date Appointed</u>	<u>Date Of Birth</u>	<u>Share %</u>
Director	MR BC DE BRUYN Confirmed by the Registrar of Companies	30/04/1987		
Director	MR PAR ERASMUS Confirmed by the Registrar of Companies	30/04/1987		
Director	MR MJR COETZEE Confirmed by the Registrar of Companies	30/04/1987		

OPERATIONS

All details pertaining to the establishment of the subject were declined.

The directors of the concern are also directors of Armscor and are based in Pretoria. The directors are not involved in the day to day running of the subject.

Mr Louw is the General Manager.

Mr Smuts is the accountant.

Mr HC Cromie is the administrative and financial manager.

Dr de Wet is the Operations Manager.

Dr R van Reenen is the Research and Technology Manager.

Ninety five percent of the subject's operations are in the



## INSTITUTE FOR MARITIME TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTD

Cape and the balance in the Transvaal and Natal.

The subject operates in the technical field of system research as well as maritime research and development. The largest client is the South African Defence Force, Navy but work contract is also undertaken for commercial concerns on a smaller scale. This section has a staff of 85 and the managers are as shown above.

The subject has two divisions:

- Maritech situated in John Costas Street, Plankenberg Industria, Stellenbosch with a staff of 25. The manager of this division The premises comprise of offices, a laboratory, workshops and two large watertanks. The subject has occupied the premises since 1989. The premises are owned by the State and the buildings by the subject. The subject does not pay rent.

All information was declined.

All financial information was declined.

The subject has access to an overdraft facility through the holding company.

The terms of your enquiry of R100 000 is over 60 months.

is Mr D van Wyk. This division is an engineering workshop, where classified projects are undertaken for the Defence Force in the area of electronic components and hardware.

- Silvertech is situated next door Maritech and has a staff of 20. The manager of this division is Mr P Stark. This division operates as a laboratory as well as a small production line manufacturing high technology batteries for use by the Defence Force.

All work is conducted on a contract basis, which are obtained by tender. Details of contracts on hand were declined due to the classified nature of the work. Approximately 20% of work is sub-contracted in all field if the work load is too great.

Progress payments are called for.

SICC Code:

83249

Technical Services Industry; Other services - engineering and other commercial research, developing and testing - for example, SABS.



INSTITUTE FOR MARITIME TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTD

FLEET

The following fleet is operated from the Head office:

8 Vehicle(s) in total  
8 Car(s)

COMPANY PREMISES

BANKERS DETAILS AND COMMENTS:

Bankers: Volkskas Bank  
Branch: FISH HOEK  
Account Number: 3230146836  
Opened on: 20/07/1987

Enquiry Amount: R 2 000                      Terms: 30 Days  
Bank Code:

B

Outside sources consider the subject good for all business engagements.

There are no Refer to Drawer cheques on record.

HISTORICAL BANKERS

Bank Branch	Date Code Obtained	Amount Terms	Code	No. of R/D's
Volkskas Bank FISH HOEK	09/03/1994	R 100 000	B	
Volkskas Bank		R 42 000		



INSTITUTE FOR MARITIME TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTD

FISH HOEK	02/11/1993	30 Days	B
Volkswagen Bank		R 5 000	
WYNBERG	24/02/1993	30 Days	C
Volkswagen Bank		R 20 000	
WYNBERG		30 Days	B



## INSTITUTE FOR MARITIME TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTD

## PAYMENT ANALYSIS REPORT

## TRADE REFERENCES

Ref No.	Date Checked	Years Trading	Amount Outstanding	Amount Overdue	Ave Monthly Purchases	Terms Given	Terms Taken
7	08/1994	3				60	60
	Terms 60 days, pays at 60 days. Supplier Comment: Supplier stated that the subject purchases between R30 000 and R40 000 per month.						
6	08/1994	2				30	30
	Terms 30 days, pays at 30 days.						
5	08/1994	15			50 000	30	30
	Terms 30 days, pays at 30 days.						
12	03/1994	3			12 000	30	30
	Excellent account.						
11	03/1994	2			40 000	30	30
	Excellent account.						
5	03/1994	7			50 000	30	30
	Excellent account.						
10	03/1994	5			200	30	30
	Excellent account.						
7	11/1993	2			30 000	30	30
	Excellent account.						
5	11/1993	6				30	30
	Supplier Comment: Supplier declined to provide figures but stated that the subject is considered good for the enquiry amount. The account is considered excellent.						
9	11/1993	5			1 500	30	30



# INSTITUTE FOR MARITIME TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTD

The account is paid on due date.

8	11/1993			30	30
	The account is paid on due date.				
7	03/1993	2	10 000	30	30
	The account is paid on due date.				
6	03/1993	5	5 000	30	150
	Supplier Comment: The supplier stated that the subject is affiliated to the Government. Extensions are taken, due to all the individuals using the same account. The supplier believes the delay in payment is caused by bad administration rather than monetary problems.				
5	03/1993	6		30	30
	Supplier Comment: The supplier stated that the subject purchases for large amounts and is unable to disclose further due to the subject's connection with ARMSCOR. No problems are experienced with the account.				
4	03/1993	6	8 000	30	30
	The account is paid on due date.				
3	03/1993	5		30	30
	Supplier Comment: The supplier stated that the subject last purchased in October 1992. No problems have been experienced with the account in the past. The account has a credit limit of R10 000.				
999	10/1989	3	4 000	30	
	The account is paid on due date.				
2	10/1989			30	
	The account is paid on due date.				
1	09/1989	3	8 000	30	
	Excellent account.				

Note : Ref No. - all references obtained from the same company will have the same referee number.



INSTITUTE FOR MARITIME TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTDKREDITINFORM ASSESSMENT:

Your enquiry of:   Terms:   Date:

We have pleasure in submitting a copy of our report as per your request.

The information contained herein could be out of date. Due to the time lapsed between the date of the report and your request, our assessment and the respective comments of outside sources, may no longer apply.

We recommend an updated report be requested prior to making a credit decision.

Director:

Assessor:

Date:





## NEWS RELEASE – NUUSVRYSTELLING

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EMBARGO    None

Enquiries : Bertus Celliers  
Armscor  
Corporate Communications

Tel : (012) 428 2719

26-01-1995

### ARMSCOR CALLS FOR INQUIRY ON HELDERBERG

In a move likely to set a new standard of transparency and accountability for public bodies, Armscor has informed the Ministers of Justice and Transport that it would welcome a re-opening of the inquiry into the Helderberg accident or the convening of a second inquiry on specific issues.

In a series of articles over the past ten weeks, the Weekend editions of the Argus group have alleged that the Helderberg aircraft, which crashed into the Indian Ocean on 28 November 1987, carried rocket fuel destined for Armscor. The fuel was described as Super Mercuric Cyanate (SMC) or "red mercury" - a mixture of mercury mixed with solid sodium metal and other additives. It was alleged further that these pinkish granules that look like sugar, were transported aboard the Helderberg in tropical fish containers, was highly inflammable and would ignite as soon as it was exposed to oxygen. The series in these newspapers went on to allege that one of the drums ruptured, exposing the material to air, and then ignited, resulting in a fire that the crew was unable to fight because there were insufficient extinguishers aboard, having fought a fire on the same cargo pallet about two hours earlier.



Among a string of further allegations, it was said that Armscor representatives flew to Mauritius immediately after the accident and scoured the beaches for drums. The Armscor men got drunk at their hotel and bragged about their purpose for being in Mauritius. John Rey, a national serviceman at the time, claims to have processed 45 passports for Armscor passengers aboard a South African Air Force Hercules C-160 that left for Mauritius on the day of the accident.

After an exhaustive inquiry lasting two years and deliberated in court for two months, the Margo Commission found that a fire involving plastic and cardboard packing materials occurred in the cargo area behind the passengers on the main deck. The fire could have been started by a number of sources, such as discarded smoking materials, electrical arching, static electricity or items in the cargo such as lithium batteries or activated carbon. The crew of the Helderberg was unable to extinguish the fire due to the limited access they had to the cargo area and inadequate fire-fighting equipment. The fire caused extensive structural damage to the airframe, resulting in a mid-air break-up of the aircraft.

Armscor is concerned that the family and friends of the 159 people killed in the accident are being further traumatised by an adventurous tale, some 7 years later, with practically no effort to verify the facts or the logic of the undisclosed source information. All the relevant information, including the cargo manifests which were alleged to have been destroyed, have been and still are in custody of South African Airways.

All the items recovered from the crash have been since 1987 and still are available for inspection by journalists. A careful reading of the Margo Commission Report would have revealed to the average person that the cargo items found on the sea floor after the accident were all identified in the cargo manifests and that no drums or tropical fish were listed nor were any drums found after the accident. Had the investigative team of the Weekend Star visited the SAA warehouse at Jan Smuts Airport, they would have seen computers, which were recovered from the ocean floor, still intact. A simple inquiry to any airline company in any part of the world would have shown that tropical fish are not transported in drums as alleged.

Investigations conducted by Armscor have revealed that no substance known as super mercuric cyanate or "red mercury" is used by the defence industry. Mercuric cyanate, commonly known as mercury fulminate, is a well known explosive with no special properties. The view held by governments and international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, is that "red mercury" does not exist. It is a hoax used by international crime syndicates to trick gullible clients. Unfortunately, a few credulous scientists and politicians have also been duped. It has thus become a popular topic for media speculation throughout the world.



the Atomic Energy Corporation turned out to be pure lead. Armscor and the Atomic Energy Corporation have always been convinced that "red mercury" does not exist and no effort has ever been made to either procure or manufacture it.

These irresponsible and unconfirmed allegations have tarnished the reputation of Armscor and the Government of National Unity at a time when South Africa is making a serious bid to secure overseas defence contracts and earn revenue to drive the Reconstruction and Development Programme.

Armscor has various options open to it. It could remain silent and not enter this murky conspiracy. It could sue the Weekend Star in a court of law. Or it could refer the matter to the Press Council as has been done. All these options, however, would be closed, prolonged and not remove the finding of guilt firmly entrenched in the minds of the general public.

In order to restore its legitimacy and credibility among the public and to resolve the matter as speedily as possible, Armscor has called for any further inquiry to determine :

1. Whether the Minister of Transport should request a re-evaluation of the facts on the crash of the Helderberg?
2. Whether the Helderberg was transporting any material whatsoever destined for Armscor or any of its subsidiaries at the time?
3. If so, did the transportation of the said material result in the fire aboard the Helderberg?

Such further inquiry would afford all witnesses full opportunity to testify on these aspects and put forward any documentation that they may have to dispute Armscor's innocence. Armscor has also recommended that the proceedings be televised live and that no part be held in camera.

Armscor has stated publicly in the past that a team of five Armscor personnel from the Institute of Maritime Technology flew to Mauritius 5 days after the accident to assist in the search for the aircraft cockpit recorder. They boarded the tug Wolraad Woltemade the next day and played a major role in the subsequent search at sea. Dr Strumpfer and Mr Potgieter of IMT arrived on the island a week after the accident and were members of the team directing the search operations. They stayed on the island for one month. The only Armscor personnel that went to Mauritius on the Air Force flights that transported Puma helicopters to the island to search for survivors, were aircraft ground-crew personnel from Atlas. Armscor has not checked the drinking habits of its employees as the level of discipline within the organisation did not



The Margo Commission cost the government about R 30 million. It is hoped that the Argus Group would make a substantial contribution to the Reconstruction and Development Programme to repay the taxpayer at the conclusion of this painful experience.

Issued by :

ABBA OMAR  
GENERAL MANAGER  
CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS




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David:  
It proved that there  
no amount of ...  
the SA

... letters must fit together.


## AFFIDAVIT

1. My name is Mr. Willem Bothma, ID number 5610145224086.
2. I depose this affidavit in English, and I am happy to do so, as I understand the contents fully as well as the oath, and consider it binding on my conscience.
3. On 1 February 1979 I started work with South African Airways (SAA) as a Cabin Crew Member. I resigned as a crew member on 16 March 1990, and returned as a ground personnel member from 5 May 1993 to the end of February 1998.
4. In order to fulfil my duties as a Cabin Crew member, on Sunday 22 November 1987 I left Jan Smuts airport for Mauritius, and stayed there until Thursday 26 November 1987. From Mauritius I left for Taipei on the 26<sup>th</sup> of November 1987, and arrived there on Friday the 27<sup>th</sup> of November 1987. Attached is a copy of my official passport which supports this fact, marked "WB1". + o "WB6"  Ge
5. When my flight landed in Taipei on 27 November 1987, the cockpit was visited by a South African Air Force Colonel. I recognised him as I had seen him several times before, and he had often visited the Cockpit on his arrival at Taipei. The Captain had told me that he was the military attaché.
6. At approximately 10h00 on the 28<sup>th</sup> of November 1987 I received a telephone call at my Hotel from First Officer (Co-Pilot) John Wessels. He asked me if I had heard that the Helderberg was 2 hours overdue at Mauritius. I responded I had not heard this. I enquired whether the plane had landed at Diego Garcia, and he answered that this was not the case, and that SAA had checked there as a priority. I then suggested that he and I meet downstairs and go to the SAA offices to find out what was going on. We arrived at the SAA offices at approximately 10h20, local time. We were met by the the SAA Office in Taipei, Mr. Tinus Jacobs, and the Manager of SATOUR



African Tourism) Mr. Pierre Roos, who was the previous SAA Taipei Office Manager.


7. Mr. Tinus Jacobs asked us to remain there to help answer phones and other queries, which we did. Almost every phone call was from the Chief of SAA, Mr. Gert van der Veer, or from Mr. Tienie Willemse, who was very high up in SAA – possibly second in charge of SAA. He instructed us to say "No Comment" to the media or anyone else who asked us questions about what had happened.
8. At about noon, not too long after I had arrived, one of the phone calls I took was from Mr. van der Veer, who said to me "I will be sending a telex within a few minutes, and you must personally go to the SATOUR offices to receive it. You must take it and personally hand it to Mr. Tinus Jacobs without anyone else seeing it." SAA did not have a telex machine at that time. The telex duly arrived and I read the telex as I took it off the SATOUR machine and it stated: 'seize all cargo documents related to SA295. No one to see it.' I handed the telex to Mr. Tinus Jacobs and never saw it again. I also never saw the cargo documents, before or after that telex arrived.
9. I have been told by flight deck crew members who were waiting at Mauritius airport waiting to relieve the Helderberg's flight crew who were coming from Taipei that Captain Uys had begun transmitting to the MRU tower but that he was speaking in Afrikaans, and as a result the Mauritanian MRU tower controllers were unable to understand what he was saying. As a result they called up the relief flight deck members to help listen and translate what Capt. Uys was saying. I have been told by them, and I verily believe that what they tell me is accurate, that Capt. Uys had stated that a fire had started in the Helderberg not too far from Taipei airport, probably about 2 or 3 hours after take-off. Capt. Uys further had stated that the fire had started in the main deck cargo compartment. Crew members had been sent in to fight the fire. These were Geoff Burchell and Manny de Almeida initially, and when they did not return, the Junior Engineer, Mr. Daniels went to investigate and help fight the fire. Other crew had also been involved in fighting the fire. They believed that they had successfully extinguished the blaze, but between 1 and 2 hours from Mauritius, the blaze had reignited and they had used up all their fire extinguishers, and it was these events, ie a second fire, which had caused the panic in which Capt. Uys had started to transmit






in Afrikaans. I was told that the last transmission had been made when the Helderberg was approximately 210 miles North East of Mauritius.

10. On 1 December 1987 I was flown back to South Africa from Taipei by SAA. We did so via Mauritius, and were met by Mr. van der Veer at Mauritius when we landed.
11. When flying back to South Africa from Mauritius, we were told that we were not going to be going back to Jan Smuts airport the usual way. Instead of going through customs and immigration, we were smuggled into the SAA offices through the back entrance. This was very strange for international crew, and had never happened before, and I never saw it being done again. We were told that this was done to avoid the media who were waiting at customs and immigration at the airport.
12. In the course of my duties in the early 1980s, I was often required to fly into Ben Gurion on SAA planes. On two or three occasions I witnessed pallets being loaded into the cargo holds of the passenger planes. On these pallets were missiles. They were covered by a tarpaulin, but when they were loaded the tarpaulin had shifted and the missiles were exposed. This would not have been visible to passengers because I was stationed on top of the aft stairs at the No. 5 door, as required by safety regulations, and I had a perfect view of the loading process. I have been through military training and was regularly put through refresher courses, and am able to clearly identify and recognise a missile when I see one. This confirmed my suspicions that SAA was using passenger planes to transport military equipment, arms and ammunition into South Africa to contravene the embargo on the country at that time.
13. Among the staff of SAA, it was reported that the contents of the cargo in the Helderberg which had caused the fire was rocket fuel being transported in solid form – pellets.
14. Various SAA employees such as Vernon Nadel and Tinus Jacobs who were closely associated with the events of the crash of the Helderberg have secured great wealth, success and promotion subsequent to the event. They need to come forward to explain the source of this, to avoid the suspicion that they were bribed by SAA to keep quiet about what they know.
15. Standard operating procedure in SAA when there was a fire was to extinguish the fire as a priority, and then land the plane as soon as possible. It was also required that the pilot come to a low altitude, level out and for the front and aft doors to be opened





fully to allow the plane to ventilate once the fire had been extinguished. The code word 'snowdrop' would be used to alert flight crew that there was a fire, should this be discovered by the cabin crew, in order not to alarm passengers.




Mr. Willem Bothma

17.09.2014

I hereby certify that on 17.09.2014, in my presence at Brakpan, South Africa, the deponent signed this affidavit and swore and acknowledged that he:

- a. Knew and understood the contents thereof; and
- b. Had no objection to taking the prescribed oath; and
- c. Considered the oath to be binding on his conscience, and
- d. Uttered the words "I swear that the contents of this declaration are true, so help me God."



Signed (Commissioner of Oaths)

Full Name: Gugulethu Dube

Designation: CONSTABLE

Date: 17-09-2014

Place: BRAKPAN SAPS

Business Address: 122 CARDINAL AVE BRAKPAN

