

# Opening the Archive

“One of the key aspects of the Commission’s work has been its commitment to transparency and public scrutiny. Its records ... are a national asset which must be both protected and made accessible.”

- *TRC Final Report*

The TRC collected large amounts of valuable information about the violation of human rights and the workings of the apartheid security establishment under apartheid.

Since 2001, SAHA has used South Africa’s freedom of information legislation, the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), to test the extent to which the official TRC archive is actually accessible to the South African public. Despite recommendations of the TRC that these records should be made freely available to the public, the state has repeatedly attempted to block access to TRC records. All too often, this has resulted in unnecessarily lengthy, hostile and litigious engagements.

SAHA has secured several favorable settlements, forcing government departments to provide TRC records they had previously refused to disclose in those cases that have reached the courts. However, because of these last minute out-of-court settlements, no legal precedents have been set around access to the TRC archive, enabling government departments to continue using such blocking tactics. Going to court is expensive and time-consuming and is not recommended as the way to gain access to the TRC records going forward.

All TRC records released to SAHA are archived in SAHA Collection AL2878 a The Freedom of Information Programme Collection and can be consulted by interested members of the public at the SAHA offices in Johannesburg.

*The following news articles, published between 2007 and 2009, are reproduced with the kind permission of the newspapers involved.*

# History archive trust set for war with defence ministry

## Organisation seeks court order to obtain military intelligence files

**ZELDA VENTER**  
HIGH COURT REPORTER

**T**he SA History Archive Trust (Saha) is set to battle it out in court with the minister of defence over access to certain information contained in apartheid-era SA Defence Force (SADF) military intelligence files relating to ties between South Africa and various foreign governments.

Saha accused the SANDF of masking the bulk of information and refusing to hand it over to them.

The minister said the files were back in Zimbabwe "where they belong" and that this was done "to prevent embarrassment to South Africa".

Saha, however, is determined to obtain a Pretoria high court order to force the government to hand over the documents.

If they had been sent to Zimbabwe, they should be returned. Saha also wants the court to order that the department declare the names and positions of the officials responsible for sending the documents to Zimbabwe so that it can take legal action against them.

Piers Pigou, Saha's director, said in papers filed before court that the archive was dedicated to recapturing the country's lost and neglected history and recording history in the making.

More than four years ago Dr John Sella, a former professor of international studies who has since died, applied for access to certain documents from the department in terms of the provisions of the Promotion of Access to Information Act.

The defence department eventually informed Saha that eight of the 22 files requested had been declassified and the rest had to be masked. Pigou said they were told that some of the records were protected and not available for release. The records protected were described as box 260, volume 1-4, American Ambassadors 1966-1977.

Pigou said that two months later the department wrote to them stating that the archive was no longer the custodian of some of the documents pertaining to military information, as these had been "transferred to the country of origin" - Zimbabwe.

He said the department did not give any explanation for not providing the remainder of the documents requested.

Pigou said the grounds for refusing access to the protected records were that the disclosure "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual".

It was also stated that the records contained information relating to military tactics in preparation for hostilities.

Saha expressed its concern that

the records were transferred, despite the request to hand them over before the transfer. The trust also objected that no copies of the documents had been retained.

Pigou said access to information was central to meaningful participation in the democratic process. He also stated that he had reason to believe the documents were not transferred to Zimbabwe, as authorities there claimed they had not received any documents from South Africa.

But Siviwe Njikela, of the SANDF's legal services, stated that the documents were in Zimbabwe because they belonged to that country.

He said the files were official Rhodesian security force records from 1964 to 1979. They had been obtained unofficially by the SADF's military intelligence division in 1980 and kept in the archives for safe-keeping.

"At the time the provenance of the Rhodesian files was not realised ... The issue was discussed and all the relevant aspects, including security, were considered. It was decided to return them to Zimbabwe to prevent embarrassment to South Africa should their provenance become known," he said.

Njikela said no court can order the SANDF to have them returned from Zimbabwe.

It is believed that the application will be heard early next year.

# INSIGHT

The Security Branch's

# EX-FILES

Mystery surrounds the whereabouts of hundreds of files detailing information gathered by apartheid government spies

Michael Schmidt

**The missing documents include information on police informers and turncoats ... a treasure trove**



**E**lectronic copies of Security Branch (SB) files detailing how hundreds of activists and public personalities – from current Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils to artist Vladimir Tretchikoff – were spied on have vanished.

But surviving indexes of the files paint a paranoid picture of the apartheid regime in its dying days from the early 1980s until the mid-94.

They reveal how the SB and its agents spied on everything from churches, primary schools and the SA Cricket Union to the Afrikaner Broederbond; Apla, the PAC's armed wing; and the American CIA, as well as individuals who included journalists and bishops, writers and Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging heavies.

Researchers at Wits University's South African History Archives (Saha) contend that 11 back-up tapes made of the SB's computerised database at its headquarters in Pretoria have disappeared, after having been unearthed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996.

Also, Saha says, every one of 10 requests to the National Archives by individual ex-activists for access to their personal hard-copy files has been met with the claim that the files cannot be found – raising fears the paper records have vanished too. Among the 10 requests was one by ex-TRC chief investigator advocate Dumisa Ntsebeza for access to his file. He was told it could not be found.

As the missing documents include information on police informers and turncoats, the records could be a treasure trove not only for researchers and for apartheid's victims seeking closure, but also for politicians wanting to score points off their opponents.

In February 1996, then police commissioner, George Fivaz, ordered the nine provincial Crime Intelligence (ex-SB) heads to hand him all the files still in their possession relating to individuals and organisations spied on by the old SB. But the order came too late for many of the records, as the SB had

already tried to cover its tracks.

A remarkable written response to Fivaz's request from Director Paul de Kock, Free State head of SAPS detective services, dated July 31 1996, states: "All files and documentation (index) under control of the former Security Branch in the Free State pertaining to individuals and organisations for the period 1960 ... to 1993 ... were destroyed upon instructions from Security Branch HQ Pretoria.

"No written instructions were received, but verbal instructions were given by ex-Brigadier A Oosthuizen stationed at Security Branch HQ Pretoria.

"No record was kept as to how many files were destroyed as mentioned ... no date can be given for the destruction, but it took place during the latter part of 1992 and the beginning of 1993."

Oosthuizen was apparently referring to Brigadier Alfred Oosthuizen, then head of the SB's intelligence section in Pretoria, who had issued at least

one killing order to the infamous Vlakplaas death squad, for which he was later given amnesty.

Early in Oosthuizen's career, as a young police lieutenant in Grahamstown in 1977, he had set up the roadblock, arresting a "cheeky" Steve Biko, who was murdered in detention several weeks later.



# The secret files that still haunt SA

We are supposedly a democracy, but this country's cloak and dagger past remains a major part of its present and future, writes Bryan Rostron

**Y**OU discover that you're married to someone you've never met or, worse still, dead. South Africans can find themselves trapped in a bureaucratic nightmare if information held by the state is incorrect. But imagine those records were compiled by secret police.

Mysteriously you're stymied at every turn, never allowed to know why. It's also a form of identity theft.

This, in effect, is what's happened to many of our most toxic secrets from the past.

They're still buried in files and our new rulers seem almost as devoted as the old regime to keeping those apartheid-era records as far from our gaze as possible.

"I don't think we are doing very well, frankly," says Verne Harris, director of the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory.

"The major reason, I think, has to do with cultures of secrecy. There's a deadly mix of old apartheid personnel – there are still many strong pockets of them – mixing with the culture of secrecy associated with the liberation (movements) underground and (in) exile. There's a meeting of minds between those old and new spooks."

Intelligence agencies of the democratic era have for years played a cat-and-mouse game with archival experts about the whereabouts, even the existence, of apartheid-era security documents.

In many instances, they have simply lied.

Thus no one has any idea of the extent of material available to examine the full history of apartheid. In some cases, the existence of huge caches of vital security agency documents have only been revealed by inadvertent bureaucratic slip-ups.

"The recommendation of the Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) was for an archival audit, but that never happened, so we simply don't know

what documents are out there," says Piers Pigou, the director of the South African History Archive (Saha).

"But Saha has been able to establish that the military withheld 90 percent of their documents from the TRC, and we found that out entirely by mistake. We asked for three file series that we knew about and a clerk unwittingly replied: 'No, we have 42 file series'."

Vast quantities of incriminating state records were shredded or incinerated in the dying days of the National Party government.

In their seminal book *Unfinished Business – South Africa, Apartheid and Truth*, Terry Bell and Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza state, "In little more

**The paranoia of the ANC, especially in exile, is well documented. This culture of secrecy still thrives today**

than six months in 1993, while political parties of the apartheid state negotiated with the representatives

of the liberation movements, some 44 metric tons of records from the National Intelligence Service alone were destroyed. There was so much material that state incinerators could not cope; the furnaces of private companies, such as steel maker Iscor had to also be used. Into these flames disappeared the last vestiges of the voices of thousands of victims."

Grotesquely, the old regime was not the only authority prepared to obliterate precious documentary records from our recent past.

"In 1996 I was part of a team that walked into a room where both old

and new spooks were systematically destroying records of the old Bophuthatswana Intelligence Service – a year after Nelson Mandela had ordered a moratorium on destroying documents," recalls Verne Harris.

The Saha endured years of official "lies, denials and obfuscation" trying to trace 34 boxes of TRC files, some of which were regarded as highly sensitive, like that of murdered ANC envoy Dulcie September in 1988. Finally, after much duplicity and denials, the Ministry for Intelligence Services admitted possession and – after a three-year legal battle – the files were transferred to the national archives. Half of these files are now in the public domain.

The other half can only be accessed through official applications which, claim archival experts, is effectively a "brick wall".

So what is going on? This is not simply a matter of drawing a line under the past. After all, many of those mentioned in the files are still



living and, theoretically, have a right to information about themselves.

Secrets, however, are also political currency. Secrets are power.

There will also be compromising information in the files, not only about the nefarious activities of apartheid officials, but about the ambiguous role of some liberation "heroes" as well, possibly even high ranking current politicians.

Speculation about Joe Modise, the deceased former minister of defence, for example, continue to surface, while Peter Makoba, the late former youth leader who made "admissions" during an ANC security investigation, is still treated as a hero in ANC mythology.

The sad truth is that both the old and new bosses have a vested interest in keeping the past hidden.

The paranoia within the ANC, especially in exile, is well documented. Much of this culture of secrecy

and suspicion seems to survive and thrive today. The debacle over allegations by Mo Shaik that Bulelani Ngcuka was an apartheid spy, and the subsequent inquiry which exonerated him, revealed much of this festering, unresolved paranoia.

"Rumour, gossip, and insinuation seeped into the inner machinery of the movement, stopping initiatives in their tracks, always raising questions," wrote Pádraig O'Malley in his book *Shades of Difference*.

"This was the inevitable result of the movement's having been infiltrated by South African agents, at all levels, and its own awareness of its limited capacity to keep them out."

O'Malley adds: "So deeply had the enemy penetrated the ANC that when the ANC, with the assistance of its own moles in the SB (Special Branch), turned on itself to weed out 'suspects' it did so with a ruthlessness the SB admired. In the process, errors were made, individuals and families ruined, careers brought to abrupt halts."

"There was a brief, golden era of openness, but since 1999 there has been a distinct closing down," says Verne Harris.

Other countries, mostly former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, faced similar dilemmas in the transition from repressive regimes and each dealt with them differently.

Some countries, not wanting to destabilise national reconciliation, kept secret police files closed for

years. Yet this frequently led to a proliferation of rumour and smears – which, without access to records, could be neither substantiated nor dismissed. Gradually most former Soviet satellites began to open up secret records under a process known as "lustration", taken from the Latin word for ritual purification.

In Poland there are constant new revelations. Last year the Archbishop of Warsaw stepped down after

admitting to being an informer during the Communist era. Even Lech Walesa, the founder of Solidarity and Poland's first democratically elected president had to fight charges that he'd been a collaborator. He was cleared, but the taint lingered.

For many former dissidents information in their secret files was extremely painful: perhaps their husband, wife or lover had been informing on them.

Others had to fight for years to clear their names. One of the best known Czech dissidents is Jan Kavan, whose exploits in smuggling material in and out of Prague were legendary. After the Velvet Revolution, Kavan became an MP.

Then it was discovered that his 500-page secret police file claimed that, while he was the London representative of the Union of Czechoslovak Students, he held meetings with an attaché at the embassy who was an agent of the STB, the Czech equivalent of the KGB.

Kavan refused to resign and, after seven years of court cases, cleared his name.

In fact, one counter allegation in the Czech Republic is that some right-wing politicians, many of whom took no part in the resistance against Soviet tyranny, used STB files to make highly selective leaks to smear more liberal politicians, most of whom had been anti-Soviet dissidents like Kavan.

The problem, clearly, is how far can any secret police document be trusted?

"A key difficulty is how much credence one gives to the content of such files – and to be sensitive to concerns over privacy and confidentiality," agrees Pigou. "I believe the critical factor, however, is a competent information approach that can balance the need for openness with appropriate exemptions."

"At Saha we recognise there is

such a thing as a legitimate secret – we just don't feel that those making these vital decisions in South Africa employ an appropriate balance in their overall attitudes about access," he said.

Personal files that have come to light in South Africa reveal some of the crudity and ignorance of security police judgments.

Barry Streek, the late journalist, accessed his record (File 3016), to discover a 1971 recommendation, signed by the minister of justice, urging that he be restricted without delay on the basis that: "Streek is clearly a supporter of communism. His whole ideology is one of opposition to and the undermining of the current authority."

**The core of the system was a lie. They knew very well how to make lies look like truth by mixing both**

In addition to suspect, unnamed sources, there are also the dubious motives of the security handlers themselves. There is always a temptation to build up a case (and their own reputation), not to mention the possibility of personal animus. In former Soviet satellites it has been shown that, as Communist regimes crumbled, secret police deliberately and maliciously placed "poison pills" in dissidents' files, knowing that later this could ruin their reputation.

Perhaps the most sensational cases in Poland, after secret police files were fully opened in 1995, was that of Malgorzata Niezabitowska, a government spokeswoman and former Solidarity leader. She denied collab-

orating and insisted she had only been interrogated once for six hours.

"The core of the system was a lie and the system's executors were professionals," said Niezabitowska. "They knew very well how to make lies look like truth by mixing both in words and in documents."

A court verdict later ruled she had been registered as a spy but that there was no evidence she was aware

of this fact. Clearly there is a great deal of ambiguity contained in all secretive documents.

The first, most complete, revelations were from East German Stasi files after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

A major reason for this is that the collapse of the East German regime was rapid and total. West Germany virtually took over; it was like a successful invasion. In most other countries, South Africa included, there's been a more fraught transition: many sensitivities – and therefore secrets – had to be balanced and placated. Yet how can we continue, 15 years after our first democratically elected government, to accept this protracted silence about so many apartheid-era documents?

The obstruction appears to be a mix of disinterest, incompetence, but above all officialdom's enduring love of secrecy for its own sake.

Pigou points out: "Our Freedom of Information Act is premised on the right to access, except in specific cases. But most bureaucrats consider us an irritation and their starting point tends to be, 'we have no intention of giving you this information ... and you can go blue in the face to make your point'. That's not how it was meant to be."

Concealment is the trademark of secret policemen. Not democracy.

● **Brian Rostron's new novel *Black Petals (Jacana)* is about a South African archivist who stumbles across a surveillance file on himself – and doesn't recognise this person at all.**

# 34 Boxes of 'Sensitive' Records

In 2001, SAHA submitted an access to information request to secure copies of 34 boxes of 'sensitive' TRC records that had been truncated from the TRC archive by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) prior to the transfer of all TRC materials to the National Archives. The whereabouts of these records was then concealed, making them entirely inaccessible.

SAHA, considering the disclosure of these records to be in the public interest, pursued access to these records in the face of public denials, obstruction and misdirection from the Department of Justice and the National Intelligence Agency. When SAHA eventually secured a detailed listing, it became apparent that most of these documents were already in the public domain. It took over three years before an out of court settlement was reached with the Department of Justice to release the majority of these records to SAHA.

*Extracts from these records are presented between pages 47 and 57. Related news articles, published between 2003 and 2004, are reproduced on pages 58 and 59, with the kind permission of the newspapers involved.*

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## 12. State vs Sithole, Richardson

### (a) Memorandum about Mrs Mandela

Before the State vs Richardson case went to trial, a memorandum was drawn up outlining the events which lead to Stompie's death and addressing the role Mrs Mandela played. A summary of the statements in the case outline the events including Katiza Cebekhulu's complaint of sexual harassment, the allegation that Stompie was an informer, the assault by Winnie Mandela as described by Cebekhulu, the assault of the four boys by the other accused.

According to the document, Guybon Kubheka also kicked Stompie many times a day or two later. Richardson removed Stompie from the room where he had been assaulted later on January 1, 1989. Stompie was not seen alive again after that. His body was found on January 6, 1989 in a piece of open veld about 6 km from the Mandela-home.

- The file also refers to wide media coverage of the events, the dockets in the case, and
- Verryn's replies to the allegations against him.

The evidence shows that Mrs Mandela ordered the group of people to go and fetch Stompie and the three other boys. Winnie Mandela has not made a statement yet. However, she told the boys, "You are not fit to be alive". She started the assault, after which the accused joined in. Multiple areas of colouring and bruising were found on Stompie's body.

Evidence of bleeding under the skin on his head exists, and the left key bone was broken. The stab wounds to Stompie's neck were the eventual cause of death, but these wounds could have caused death and certainly sped up his death. Kenneth

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Kgase escaped from Winnie Mandela's home on January 7, 1989 and was examined the same evening. Several wounds were found and are described in the document. Thabiso Mono was "released" on January 16, according to media reports after Pres. Mandela told Mrs Mandela to do so, and several wounds were found on his body. Kenny's wounds are also described. Mekgwe was released on the same date and examined on January 18, 1989. Several wounds were found and are also described.

A sjambok was found in a back room. Blood was found on the sjambok. Blood was found on all four walls, the floor and the ceiling of one back room. Blood was also found on clothing which was confiscated. One of the blood types matched Stompie's blood type. Blood of the same type as Mekgwe's was found on a blanket. No semen was found in a monster taken from Stompie's anus.

(b) Chronology in Stompie-case

A chronology of events in the Stompie-case was drawn up prior to the trial. These include interviews with witnesses and accused, the dates of trial, the investigation team's visit to Mrs Mandela's Diepkloof home, dates of conversations with Bishop Storey, Ms Satchwell, Mr Bullender (acting for the three key witnesses), the date of Richardson's release on bail, communication between different police officers, the AG's actions, the addition of Mrs Mandela to the list of accused, press releases and other dates not directly relevant to the investigation.

c) Letter to AG in Sithole-case

AJ Swanepoel, vice-AG in the Witwatersrand, writes to the AG on February 15, 1991 that further investigation continues, but that a serious setback has been experienced in that four of the accused did not attend their trial.

Mrs Mandela was visited by Ismail Ayob, lawyer, and the Crisis Committee, who tried to convince her to release the two complainants who were still in her custody.



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SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS OR INFORMATION IN THE POSSESSION OF THE GAUTENG  
INVESTIGATION UNIT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION LINKING  
MRS WINNIE MANDELA TO CERTAIN GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

- LIELA GROENEWALD

This document is a summary of statements made to the TRC, the police, the press  
and other parties on a series of events to which Mrs Mandela has somehow been  
linked. Information in the investigation file which is relevant to cases, but has no  
bearing on Mrs Mandela, has not been included in this summary.

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ANNEXURE A  
STAFF PAPER  
DD DECEMBER 1992

## RISK ACTIVITIES OF SADF COMPONENTS

*This document represents source information and conclusions that have been made available to Lt-Gen Steyn. In addition to other information available, the intelligence picture has been used as basis for the Staff Paper.*

1. An analysis of information available indicate that some members, contractual members and co-workers of the SADF were involved, and in some instances are still involved in illegal and unauthorised activities that harm the security, interests and welfare of the State. The spectrum of these activities includes murders, deeds of terrorism, disruption and influencing activities, destabilisation activities abroad, corruption, promotion of factional party political objectives and blatant disregard of Government policy.
2. The motives of individuals involved are diverse and vary from personal gain, reprisal, personal political agendas and pursuit of strategic and tactical objectives in conflict with Government policy. However, some role players are caught up in activities of the past that are unacceptable in this era.
3. Evidence at the disposal of the Counterintelligence Community on which the above statements rest, are based on facts, both confirmed and unconfirmed information from reliable sources, and indications are that these are true. The information is also based on evidence submitted in court and at other investigation forums.
4. A cursory examination of the information indicates that the above activities were mainly centralised at certain Defence components, i.e. the Directorate Covert Collection (DCC) of Division Intelligence, Army Foundation (GS2), and certain components of Special Forces and 7 Medical Battalion.

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5. Summarised the intelligence picture pertaining to the above Defence components is as follows:

a. **Directorate Covert Collection (DCC)**

- i. Destabilisation of the internal political situation by means of planning and executing coups in self-governing territories and manipulation of important political role players.
- ii. The instigation of unrest through murder, providing political factions with arms and executing intimidation activities.
- iii. Members' involvement in planning to ruin the Government's reform initiatives through the escalation of violence.
- iv. Corruption among members by means of illegal trading in weapons.
- v. Involvement in planning and committing murders with major political consequences (e.g. FLORES case).

b. **Army Intelligence (GS2)**

- i. Discrediting activities against the ANC and other political opponents.
- ii. Influencing activities and perception creation in the mass media as well as in the SADF.
- iii. Intelligence support for destabilisation operations.
- iv. Members' participation in coup-related planning.
- v. The dissemination of disinformation.

c. **Special Forces**

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- i. Participation in destabilisation operations in black townships.
  - ii. Creation of arms caches and the development of operational launching positions in neighbouring countries.
  - iii. Training of military wings of internal political groups (e.g. Inkatha), as well as training to resistance movements in other African countries, including RENAMO.
- d. **7 Medical Battalion**
- i. Involvement in the SADF's chemical and biological warfare programmes.
  - ii. Involvement in the so-called "Poison murders".
  - iii. Involvement of some members in corruption for personal gain.
  - iv. Involvement in Chemical attack on Frelimo.
  - v. Handling of drugs for operational utilisation.
6. When analysing the intelligence picture, it would appear that the senior command structure of the above Defence Force components are controlled by Lts-Genl G Meiring and C.P. Van der Westhuizen, who in turn are under the command of the Head of the SADF, Gen Kat Liebenberg. To a high degree, Generals Liebenberg and Van der Westhuizen are caught up in the momentum of activities of the past, which at present, receive prominent negative publicity, whilst Gen Meiring promotes a personal agenda against the interests of the State.
7. At executive level and in varying degrees, the following senior officers are linked to the above activities as a result of their positions of command or their personal involvement in the said activities.
- a. Brig Jake Swart
  - b. Gen H Roux

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Office of the Executive Deputy President

- CONFIDENTIAL -

06/10/03  
A van der Merwe  
SANDF

Telephone : (012) 323 2502  
Enquiries : Ms N Pieterse  
Date : 19 August 1995

Mr Sydney Mufamadi  
Minister of Safety and Security  
Private Bag X463  
PRETORIA  
0001

Fax number : (012) 320 5065 / (021) 461 2594

Dear Minister Mufamadi

THE CASE OF MY POISONING BY ELEMENTS OF THE APARTHEID SECURITY FORCES

You will recall that some time during the latter part of 1996 I wrote a letter to urge you to pursue the case of my poisoning as well as that of the Khotso House bomb in the light of new information emerging then from sources within the security establishment.

You will recall that a former policeman called Paul Erasmus confessed to having put me in a death list requested by a senior officer as well as having been personally involved in the scouting and reconnaissance operations around myself which led to my poisoning, and around Khotso House which led to its bombing by security forces. Mr Erasmus also said that he knew the name of the person who actually applied the organophosphate chemical leading to my near-fatal poisoning, and that the said person was under the witness protection programme of the Justice Department.

With all this information at hand then and following a special request to your ministry to reopen this case I expected the security forces to pursue the matter more vigorously. But since a detailed statement was taken from me in September/October 1995 I have not heard anything from the police. You will recall that I also requested that my personal effects (baggage) which were left with the FBI since 1969 be returned back to the country as they would form an important part of the exhibits for this case. But seemingly nothing has been done about it as well.

In the year up to date more information has been coming out shedding more light to my poisoning. The Surgeon-General and General Meiring have lately now confirmed that the South African Government did have a chemical weapons project. More information has now come out showing:

1. that the SADF chemical weapons Project involved three laboratories, namely, Delta G, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) and Protechnik,
2. that although the Surgeon-General has maintained that the SADF chemical weapons project was only to develop defensive capability and that no offensive capacity was ever developed, information coming out show that the project did move beyond defensive capability to an offensive use of the chemicals against anti-apartheid personalities. Operatives who participated in this programme

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*Spence 06/10/03*  
A van der Merwe  
SANDF

confirm that the project had two arms:

- 2.1 a large scale conventional chemical warfare arm (Delta G), and
- 2.2 a small scale dirty tricks research outfit (Roodeplaat Research Laboratories).
3. that research was done at the RRL into organophosphate poisons and that tests were done on animals, many of which died. These organophosphate poisons are similar to the ones detected in my system by the team of doctors who treated me during that awful ordeal,
4. that at least one member of the RRL staff has linked the establishment of this project with the attempt on my life using organophosphate poisoning.

I believe now that I have the right to know:

- (a) as to what the police are doing about all this information and whether or not they are still pursuing this matter,
- (b) as to whether or not the police have followed the lead to the person who is alleged to have been responsible for my poisoning who may be in the witness protection facility of the Justice Department,
- (c) as to whether or not the Surgeon-General and General Meiring have been specifically requested to confirm whether or not the chemical used on me was from the RRL or any of the facilities related to this project,
- (d) as to whether or not the National Party leadership, the Defence Force and the Police will declare their knowledge of this action of the security forces against me during their submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission this week. If not, whether or not your department will re-institute the investigation to resolve this matter.

I would like to state clearly that my pursuit of this matter is not related to a personal vendetta against those who perpetrated this cruel act. I simply wish to know as to who was involved in this matter and who gave the orders to do so, because without this knowledge nothing assures me that the said forces will not act in the same way again. Worse more, they may still be in operation with the capacity to repeat this act again against those who differ with them. My wish to know has to do with the very security of the state and the people of South Africa and the survival of our newly established democracy. It is ultimately a national security interest.

I will be pleased to hear from you as a matter of urgency.

Because of the nature of this case and the public interest in this matter I intend making the contents of this letter available to the public.

Sincerely Yours



REV. FRANK CHIKANE  
SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE EXECUTIVE DEPUTY PRESIDENT

cc. Mr J Modise, Minister of Defence  
Mr AM Omar, Minister of Justice  
Mr G Fivaz, Commissioner of Police  
Executive Deputy President Mbeki  
President Mandela

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